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Abstract 
The response to civil disturbances has historically been the aggressive use of force or 
escalation with tactics such as the use of police dogs, armed federal troops during war 
protests, and police field forces. These types of tactics can escalate tensions between 
protestors and police and only add to the violence and destruction of the incident. To 
reduce the violence between protestors and the police and the destruction often associated 
with civil disturbances, it is necessary to examine the need to include de-escalation 
techniques in the responses. This study utilized 3 theoretical frameworks, the chaos 
theory, the behavioral decision theory and the strain theory, all which complement each 
other in interpreting the opinions and experiences of participants and civil disturbance 
responses. The research questions were used to determine the influence of experience, 
training, personal biases or external influences on decision making and elicit the opinions 
of respondents in how they would respond to a civil disturbance. Twenty-five 
respondents responsible for policy or response decisions regarding civil disturbances 
from southern U.S. state emergency management and law enforcement agencies took part 
in the survey. The results of a cross-tabulation analysis determined that there is a need for 
the inclusion of de-escalation techniques and that they would be effective in civil 
disturbances. The results also showed that an aggressive response was the preferred 
method to restoring or maintaining order, but there was a need to examine changes in 
response tactics. This study may be beneficial and provide a social impact through policy 
changes, which may lead to a lessening of the severity and scope of an incident.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study  
Background 
Communities exist and flourish when normalcy is in effect; there is no chaos and 
no need for intervention by the government. On occasion, protests, civil disturbances, or 
riots occur, disrupting the normalcy of a community and in some cases plunging it into 
chaos. Farazmand (2003) suggests that, for the field of emergency management, 
“unpredictable events” such as riots can lead to disastrous results for organizations 
(p.339). It is then the duty of a jurisdiction to either maintain normalcy or return it from a 
state of chaos to one of normalcy as quickly as possible. In doing so, jurisdictions rely on 
the response of their police forces to maintain that order or return a situation, such as a 
riot, from a state of chaos to normalcy. 
Historical as well as current methods of response to civil disturbances or riots 
have relied on an aggressive show of force by authorities using armed military troops, 
police dogs, and riot forces to maintain control or regain normalcy. The response of the 
police may also contribute to whether chaos is avoided, and normalcy is maintained. 
Myers-Montgomery (2016) suggested that the militaristic appearance of law enforcement 
in response to a civil disturbance is a factor contributing to escalations in a riot. Newburn 
(2016) examined three areas of why riots do not occur: Katz’s (2008, 2012) explanation 
of the social mobility of minorities, Naegler’s (2014) examination of tension reduction 
between police and minorities, and Myers’s (2000) examination of why riots spread but 
did not describe any actions or techniques related to establishing de-escalation policies. 
Variables underlying political, economic, or social conditions of communities, such as 
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strength (the number of officers versus the number of protestors), the type of protest 
requested, and a historical record of the groups protesting, could be applied to de-
escalation strategies. 
It is then logical to suggest that if one wishes to maintain normalcy, then the 
reduction of tactics (de-escalation) would be desired, versus the increase in tactics 
(escalation), which may only exacerbate underlying tensions, leading to the creation of 
chaos, which in this case would be a riot. It can be argued that decision-making is an 
important element of and contributing factor to, why some peaceful and lawful protests, 
turn violent and in some cases into riots. Poor decision-making and the reliance on 
previous tactics or methods of crowd control only add to the amount of escalation. 
Simonson and Staw (1992) stated that “little attention has yet been given to procedures 
that might help people avoid the escalation trap” (p. 419). If the same old tactics of 
escalation are considered detrimental to the overall mission of response to a civil 
disturbance, it is rational to consider de-escalation techniques in these situations.   
Problem Statement 
Historically, responses to civil disturbances or riots have been characterized by 
aggressive shows and uses of force (i.e., escalation). Since the 1960s, tactics such as the 
use of police dogs in Birmingham, AL, in 1963 (Maurantonio, 2014), armed federal 
troops during war protests at Kent State University in 1970 (Steidl, 2013) and police field 
forces, have been utilized to restore order and achieve normalcy in the community 
(Miller, 2001). The individuals who decide the responses to civil disturbances as a 
general rule, should always seek ways to de-escalate rather than have a confrontation 
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between rioters and police. The problem of escalating an event versus de-escalating and 
avoiding destruction and disruption within the community, is one that can be appreciated 
across our country and by others around the world. The deployment of resources in 
response to a civil disturbance is actuality an escalation of the situation by the 
government. Simonson and Staw (1992) suggested that the study of de-escalation 
techniques could provide a basis for emergency managers from the escalation of 
situations and the over commitment of resources. 
Therefore, the problem is that, although researchers know that current responses 
by the government towards civil disturbances are considered escalation, it has not been 
determined whether there a need for de-escalation techniques to be incorporated into 
policies and response protocols. The study will contribute to the knowledge in this field 
by addressing whether there is a need to include de-escalation techniques into the 
responses to civil disturbances or riots. The social benefit of this research is that policy 
makers can use the findings to inform policy changes which could lessen the severity and 
scope of an incident. 
Research Purpose 
The purpose of this research is to bridge the gap in literature and explore aspects 
of de-escalation techniques and whether there is a need to incorporate such techniques 
into response policies as tactics that could be used to reduce the violence between 
protestors and the police and the destruction often associated with riots. The goal of law 
enforcement and the emergency managers who design policy in this area is to maintain 
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normalcy or return to normalcy from a state of chaos, which is the basis of the chaos 
theory (Farazmand, 2003). 
Theoretical Framework 
The chaos theory was “founded on the mathematics of nonlinear systems” (Kiel & 
Elliot, 1996, p. 2). In comparing linear and nonlinear systems in the context of a civil 
disturbance, a scenario occurs where the police confront a protest and deploy a group of 
officers to engage the protestors, who then heed warnings and directions from police and 
conform to those requests being made. This is an example of a linear system where the 
police expect and get a definitive response, one that they expected. The nonlinear system 
example, or the unexpected, would be to take in all other possibilities, including 
nonconformity to lawful requests, the infusion of violence and criminal activity, or an 
unnecessary need to escalate the situation. With the possibility of chaos erupting from 
normalcy, or a peaceful event turning violent, there must be an examination of the 
response and if there was escalation by the government whether intentional or not. 
The behavioral decision theory (BDT) as described by Morton and Fasolo (2009) 
is the method by which people decide a course of action and the biases which influence 
them. BDT is important in showing that certain methods, which may be tried and true, 
may no longer be acceptable or practical, such as the continued escalation of an incident 
versus the consideration of de-escalation techniques. Riots and violent civil disturbances 
throughout American history have started from small benign incidents or protests and 
have escalated, mostly because of the responses by police based in what could be 
considered poor decision-making.  
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Regardless of the technique used by emergency managers, police chiefs, or 
politicians, the response to civil disturbances are as Costello (2015) stated, “one of those 
impossible jobs”. The impossible job framework was first proposed by Glidewell and 
Hargrove (1990) as a public administration theory, as a mechanism to categorize 
impossible jobs. Costello (2015) also offered the opinion that tasks within a civil 
disturbance may be difficult but not impossible. These tasks or committing to courses of 
action, may result in the escalation of a situation instead of the desired results of 
diffusion. Jurisdictions, specifically decision-makers, who do not commit to a course of 
action in the end, may result in a losing proposition, that is, escalating versus de-
escalating. 
Research Questions and Hypothesis 
In this study, I examined the premise that current responses by government 
officials are no longer practical when applied to civil disturbances or riots and that the 
need for de-escalation techniques or methods exist. I also examined whether decision 
makers are considering underlying political, economic or social conditions of 
communities affected by civil disturbances and whether the consideration of those 
conditions affect which type of response to an incident is made. The research questions 
(RQs) for this study were as follows: 
RQ1. Would the lack of experience versus actual experience influence the type of 
response action taken?  
RQ2. Would training, policies, biases or external stimuli, influence the type of 
response action taken? 
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RQ3. Would the influences of politics, economic or social conditions contribute 
to the decision-making factors such as to respond passively or aggressively?  
RQ4. Would the inclusion techniques such as de-escalation contribute positively 
in maintaining order in a community? 
The null hypothesis for each is that no such positive relationship exists. 
Methodology 
Using a quantitative method, I conducted this study by surveying law enforcement 
and emergency management professionals, including policy group members responsible 
for policy decisions, as well as officers and mid-level supervisors who may be tasked 
with carrying out those policies The chaos, behavioral decision, and strain theories  
served as a basis to elicit responses to identify if there is a need for de-escalation 
techniques in response to civil disturbances. Because the aim of the research was only to 
identify the need for de-escalation versus actual techniques, the quantitative method was 
best suited for compiling data for evaluation. I conducted a survey of professional law 
enforcement and emergency management officials through the use of a self-administered 
questionnaire through the internet survey collection service, Survey Monkey 
(https://www.surveymonkey.com). 
The research was conducted throughout the South Florida law enforcement and 
emergency management population. I chose this sample population due to a long history 
of riots from the 1960s through the 1980s and civil disturbances in the 1990s and in 2003. 
The benefit of utilizing this population sampling was that it had a strong pool of 
participants with extensive experience. Using South Florida and its history of civil 
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disturbances allows for the replication of the research, if needed, in the future in another 
community with a similar history to that of South Florida. The research method will be 
discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3.  
Significance 
Civil protests can occur peacefully or may turn violent, resulting in injuries, 
deaths, and the destruction of communities. In this research, my goal was to identify 
whether there is a need to implement ideas, techniques, and strategies that can be adopted 
by a jurisdiction to preempt the possibility of violence from escalating from a peaceful 
protest to a full-scale riot. The gathering of data from surveys completed by the 
respondents will have quantifiable data to analyze and interpret. The results of this study 
could lead to the establishment of new policy directives. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
Introduction 
Throughout the history of the United States, civil disturbances have occurred 
because of protests to wars, social inequalities and confrontations with police. The 
conventional methods of responding to such incidents in past decades, have involved the 
use of aggressive and violent means to restore order. These methods included the use of 
escalation methods such as deploying federal troops (Steidl, 2013), police field forces 
(Miller, 2001), militaristic looking equipment (Meyers-Montgomery, 2016) and tactics 
and police K-9 dogs (Maurantonio, 2014). De-escalation techniques are relatively new 
ideas being proposed in law enforcement to reduce violent confrontations and uses of 
force, but none have been applied to civil disturbances. De-escalation techniques are the 
nonphysical methods of dealing with violent or aggressive behaviors. These de-escalation 
techniques have been utilized in the mental health field (Price, Baker, Bee, & Lovel, 
2015) and for developing use-of-force policies in law enforcement (International 
Association of Chiefs of Police, 2017), but not in civil disturbances or riots. De-
escalation techniques with the mentally ill include verbal and nonphysical methods to 
replace, when possible, the use of physical restraints, which have led to patient deaths 
from positional asphyxia (Price et al., 2015). Law enforcement agencies across the 
country must also confront situations involving violent and aggressive persons and are 
turning more and more to de-escalation techniques to reduce use of force in resolving 
those incidents until additional resources or options are available (International 
Association of Chiefs of Police, 2017). What is not known is how de-escalation 
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techniques can be applied to civil disturbances. The basic premise of this study is based 
on the idea that current responses by government officials are no longer practical when 
applied to civil disturbances or riots and whether de-escalation techniques or methods are 
needed.  
The purpose of this chapter is to identify gaps in the research, through applicable 
theoretical framework(s), and review the previous research and methodological 
approaches to determine whether there is a need to include de-escalation techniques into 
the responses to civil disturbances or riots.  
Literature Search Strategy 
For this study, I reviewed literature from 2011 through 2017 on the chaos theory, 
the BDM, de-escalation, and escalation, with the inclusion of seminal works from outside 
the stated time frame. The strategy used for this literature review included simultaneous 
searches of numerous databases, using the Walden University Thoreau search tool to 
identify the relevant literature throughout numerous databases. The following keywords 
were used: de-escalation and strategies, emergency management, incident command 
systems, chaos theory, transformational theory, nonlinear dynamics and chaos, 
Behavioral Decision Theory (BDT), choice under uncertainty, escalation, evaluation, 
public administration analysis, and strain theory.  
Additionally, I consulted the following journals as sources: American 
Sociological Review, Annual Review of Psychology, British Journal of Political Science, 
Criminal Justice and Behavior, Expanded Academic ASAP, International Journal of 
Medical Toxicology and Forensic Medicine, Journal of Atmospheric Sciences, Journal of 
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Homeland Security Affairs, Journal of the Operational Research Society, Journalism and 
Mass Communication Quarterly, Public Organization Review, Management Decision, 
Resonance, and The Social Science Research. 
Research on the dependent variables, which are the response types to the actual 
civil disturbance, was evaluated to define the construct used for measurement purposes. 
The dependent variables, which are aggressive and non-aggressive responses, were 
evaluated to determine the requirements needed to define the construct for measurement 
based on their application in a civil disturbance and how they could change an event, with 
respect to the chaos theory’s premise of maintaining normalcy or returning to a state of 
normalcy.  
The independent variables in this study, the influences on the process for deciding 
whether to use an escalated or de-escalated response, were examined to define the 
construct for measurement purposes. Several independent variables, the underlying 
political, economic or social conditions, the influencers of what may be the cause of riots, 
were examined to measure if they affect the decision-making process of emergency 
managers, as to what type of response will be deployed to the civil disturbance. 
In the first section, I will discuss the historical background of civil disturbances 
and their responses. The historical background literature is based on the research of 
Simonson and Staw (1992), Miller (2001), Steidl (2013), Maurantonio (2014), and 
Meyers-Montgomery (2016). 
The second section of this literature review will include a discussion of the 
theoretical framework, based on the chaos theory, along with contributing frameworks, 
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the strain theory and the BDT. The chaos theory is being tested to determine if the 
dependent variables are influenced by the independent variables, causing the chaos theory 
to be affected in not maintaining or returning to a state of normalcy.  
In the third section of this literature review, I will discuss the different 
independent and dependent variables involved. The independent variables examined will 
provide data regarding the political, economic, or social conditions of communities to 
define the construct of this study. This political construct definition is based on the 
research of Hahn (1970); Dalton, Van Sickle, and Weldon (2010); White (2013); 
McHugh (2015); Baltimore City Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge #3 (2015); the 
Department of Justice (2015); Meyers-Montgomery (2016); and Pritchard and Pakes 
(2016). The economic construct definition is based on the research of the Kerner 
Commission (1968); Spilerman (1970); Scacco (2010); Morrell, Scott, McNeish, and 
Webster (2011); and Simpkin and Sapsed (2012). The construct of social issues is based 
on research by Merton (1967), Corwin, (1993), Olzak and Shanahan, (1996), DiPasqualea 
and Glaeser (1998), Marker (2004), the U.S. Department of Justice (2015), and Brown 
(2017). The dependent variables of aggressive (escalation) and nonaggressive responses 
(de-escalation) provide data defining the construct of the study. The aggressive 
(escalation) construct is based on the research of Curseu, Schruijer, and Fodor (2016) and 
Simonson and Staw (1992). The nonaggressive (de-escalation) construct is based on the 
research of Kesic, Thomas, and Ogloff (2013) and Price et al. (2015).  
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The last section of this chapter will identify the specific gaps in the literature, 
specifically the need or not, for de-escalation techniques in civil disturbances from the 
results of the literature review, which supports the need for this research study. 
Historical Context 
Civil disturbances historically, have prompted aggressive uses of force and tactics 
by authorities in order to regain order where riots or civil unrest were occurring. This 
included the use of the federalized military troops as seen at Kent State University in 
1970 during anti-war protests (Steidl, 2013), the use of police dogs in Birmingham, 
Alabama, in 1963 (Maurantonio, 2014) and police field forces to restore order (Miller, 
2001). The use of these tactics has been the same from time of the civil rights protests of 
the late 1950s, to the antiwar protests of the 1960s, to the current antipolice protests that 
started in Ferguson, Missouri and Baltimore, Maryland in 2014-2015.  
Each of the previous examples began as peaceful or nonviolent civil protests or 
everyday encounters between citizens and the police, which then turned violent and, in 
some cases, deadly. In examining whether de-escalation techniques are necessary, there 
must be an examination of the response polices to civil disturbances and ask whether it is 
necessary for the police to deploy or respond to each protest or act of civil disobedience.  
Simonson and Staw (1992) suggested that reductions in the underlying tensions in 
a situation are made could de-escalate those situations, which may be applicable to events 
such as a peaceful protest turning violent. Sources of tensions could include the mere 
presence of the police or a response force or the manner in which they are dressed or 
equipped (Meyers-Montgomery (2016). Considering that the unnecessary commitment of 
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resources, which is a standard course of action, may simply be an escalation factor which 
is the catalyst that leads to the violence often seen in civil disturbances.  
Meyers-Montgomery (2016) stated that most blame for the loss of life in civil 
disturbances, especially those which occur without permits, is the militarization of the 
police. The police have changed the tactics of using police dogs, batons, and water 
cannons and replaced them with armored vehicles, rifles, and new technology, such as 
long-range acoustic crowd dispersal devices. While the point made by Meyers-
Montgomery is a tactical one, one de-escalation technique would be to include BDT thus 
reducing the need for the deployment of resources or escalation of an event in the first 
place. 
Theoretical Frameworks   
The chaos theory is the theoretical framework that will be used to reinforce this 
study. The chaos theory is being utilized as the primary framework because the current 
responses by the government towards civil disturbances are to maintain a state of 
normalcy or to return to normalcy from chaos and it is the goal of this research to 
determine if there a need for de-escalation techniques to be incorporated into policies and 
response protocols. There are two additional theories, the Strain Theory and the BDT 
which will be utilized to help explain how the independent and dependent variables 
influence one another. It is important to consider all frameworks as contributing factors to 
determining the need for de-escalation techniques for the following reasons.   
The chaos theory will examine the non-linear aspects of the civil disturbance, that 
is, what course the event may take versus what is expected by planners and decision 
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makers. When an event does not progress or evolve as planned, the “linear progression” 
changes and decisions must be made to keep it from devolving into chaos and trying to 
maintain normalcy as proposed by Farazmand (2003). The strain theory will be utilized to 
try and identify underlying political, economic or social conditions, which may be 
influences as to why riots occur. The BDT, will incorporate the concepts of whether the 
current standardized and often used response techniques, are no longer valid and if there 
is now a need to evaluate policies with respect to civil disturbances. Historically, the 
decision process in the type of response to a civil disturbance has been based on an 
aggressive use of field forces. 
Chaos Theory 
The chaos theory was developed by Dr. Edward Norton Lorenz in 1963 (Lorenz, 
1963) through the experimentation of weather forecasting. Krishnamurthy (2015) states 
that the theory developed by Lorenz at its essence, is the growth in differences by two 
separate states, however small, to the larger differences of the two random states. As the 
theory was developed for weather forecasting, it was based on the inaccuracy of weather 
predictions over the long-term. The theory became known as the “butterfly effect” with 
the premise of “does the flap of a butterfly’s wings in Brazil set off a tornado in Texas?” 
(Krishnamurthy, 2015). This premise is applicable to this research in that small or benign 
incidents can grow exponentially into a large and unmanageable civil disturbance or riot 
as the result of a ripple effect, like the analogy of the butterfly wings.   
Murphy (1996) suggests that chaos is not random in its development but is the 
result of systems which do not evolve in a linear fashion or as predicted. Civil 
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disturbances or riots when examined in their entirety, do have distinctive patterns and 
structures, but it is not realistic to forecast what may or could happen based on past 
events either from the same incident or a previous one. Farazmand (2003) in examining 
the relationships of systems or their segments, suggests that it is important to know why 
opposing systems or segments change, become unstable and from a new order or 
stability. The primary focus of any emergency management official is to try and prevent 
chaos by maintaining a normalcy in the community or returning it from chaos, as quickly 
as possible. Chaos in the form of a civil disturbance or riot, is a social phenomenon that 
may be planned for, but is unpredictable and to maintain normalcy in the community, its 
destructive effects must be controlled.  
Strain Theory 
Merton (1967) hypothesizes in Marker (2004) that individuals who engage in 
aberrant behavior or activities when structural barriers exist preventing the attainment of 
goals desired by most in society. Strain theory assumes that members of society adhere to 
societal values to achieve cultural goals. Additionally, strain theory assumes that socially 
disadvantaged individuals cannot achieve cultural goals legitimately resulting in the 
individual abandoning their personal standards and values. Because of the inability of the 
individual to attain their goals, the possibility of illegal behaviors can manifest 
themselves as a response to those failures (p. 12).       
Marker (2004) suggests that violent action (e.g., rioting) are the result of the 
breakdown of changing cultural norms when social structures impede an individual from 
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achieving societal goals (p. 12). The impediments to social achievement by an individual 
include education, political stature and financial independence.   
The strain theory is relevant to this research specifically with respect to the 
independent variables discussed later in this chapter. The independent variables align in 
examining the historical look at the underlying political, economic or social conditions of 
communities who have experienced riots. 
Behavioral Decision Theory  
Experiences have shown that not all decision makers make the correct decisions 
in times of crisis and sometimes repeat their mistakes which compounds the complexity 
of the response to an incident. During these crisis events, the decision-making structure 
may only include a single issue or may be more complex and consist of “multi-criteria 
decision analysis (MCDA)” (Morton & Fasolo, 2009, p.1). During civil disturbances or 
riots there are often, times of critical decision-making, involving numerous factors which 
may or may not be related, but none the less, must be dealt with simultaneously.  
Morton & Fasolo (2009) suggest that the BDT be utilized for the following 
reasons. The first is to understand the thought process of those making decisions without 
assistance and the second is to identify biases which may affect those decisions. The 
MCDA process consists of structuring, assessing values, weighting criteria and sensitivity 
analysis. Structuring represents the decision makers goals and objectives during an 
incident and is important to consider as a part of the de-escalation process. The 
assessment of values during an incident is important in determining if the course of action 
to be taken is for example a good one tactically. As an example, would the deployment of 
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riot control forces exacerbate the situation in a negative way or will the results be a 
positive result. 
Conclusion 
The theories examined for this research all have contributory aspects into the way 
responses to civil disturbances are conducted, along with factors which affect the 
decision-making processes of those responses. The public, those who watch these civil 
disturbances today, do so from a 24-hour news perspective based on innuendo and non-
factual information from reporters and residents who are not privy to the influences of the 
decision-making process. As such, the time-tested responses to civil disturbances, large 
field police field forces, less-lethal weapons and militaristic looking equipment, are 
interpreted by the public as being too harsh or heavy-handed and do not consider the 
underlying political, economic or social conditions of communities, when trying to 
maintain or restore order according to the chaos theory. The literature provides ample 
information regarding the chaos theory and the basis upon which incidents may or may 
not follow a linear progression, as well as the factors involved in decision-making, but 
there is a gap in the information regarding de-escalation and its applicability to civil 
disturbances.   
Variables 
Independent Variables 
Creswell (2013) defines an independent variable “as those that (probably) cause, 
influence or affect outcomes” (p. 50). The independent variables to be considered will 
include a historical look at the underlying political, economic or social conditions of 
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communities who have experienced riots. These independent variables while not 
complete in totality, may provide enough rationale as to how civil disturbances devolve 
from peaceful protests into riots and if the decisions to use either an escalation or de-
escalation are influenced by them.  
Political activity. Politics in America as with most other countries is based upon 
power and trying to maintain stability or attempting to make changes incrementally or by 
large power grabs. The structure of the United States’ Constitution guarantees the right of 
free speech and assembly (within lawful means). As a result, the United States embraces 
what Dalton et al. (2010) describe as an open “Political Opportunity Structure” (POS), 
which encourages political activity and protest.     
Examples of the POS encouraging political activity and protest became evident 
during “the Baltimore Riots of 2015” where the Mayor, Stephanie Rawlings-Blake, said 
her city government “gave those who wished to destroy space to do that,” (McHugh, 
2015). In addition, according to the Baltimore City Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge #3 
After-Action-Report (2015), orders were issued by Police Commissioner, “the Baltimore 
Police Department would not respond until they [the protestors] burned, looted, and 
destroyed the city so that it would show that the rioters were forcing our hand.”  
In an article by Hahn (1970) conducted in the aftermath of the turbulent decade of 
the 1960s in which many American cities experienced riots from within their African-
American communities, he examined why some incidents provoke outbreaks of violence 
while others do not. Hahn suggested that while violence may occur in some communities 
and not in others, may be the inability of those local political structures to resolve issues 
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on the local level. It is this inability to resolve issues that contributes to the end result, 
violence in the community. In the same research article in aftermath of the 1967 Detroit 
riots, Hahn surveyed residents of that city who responded by a total of sixty-three 
percent, that the threat of violence had significant influence on politicians to respond to 
the needs of the African-American community (p. 102).    
Political correctness must also now be considered when responding to a protest or 
civil disturbance. The Ferguson, Missouri riots of 2014, which grew from protests against 
police, in which a black man was killed by a white police officer. The Department of 
Justice in their After-Action-Report (2015) found that police response measures to the 
riots were in some cases, improper. In the report, findings were made in which the 
“optic” of canine units were thought to stir emotions because of racial tensions in those 
observing the protests and those actually protesting. The “militarization” of the police 
also was found to be inappropriate because this too, inflamed tensions and created a fear 
within the protestors. The need to curtail the response actions of police by politicians is 
consistent with POS in allowing protests. 
The motivations of crowds may be the driving force of whether a peaceful protest 
devolves into a riot or if the crowd provides the “spark” which leads to a loss of control 
of an event by authorities. In a study by White (2013) crowd types (peaceful, purposeful, 
or hostile crowds) were examined to isolate violence in crowd behaviors, by observing 
different types of public events. Observable variables were introduced to try and 
understand if crowds become violent because of the individual or if the individual is 
changed by the crowd. White’s research determined that the “crowd” is a very dangerous 
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entity. Individuals may no longer maintain independence but instead, become the mob, 
which may have its own motivations and outcomes beyond the control of the individual. 
The type of crowd present during a peaceful protest or one that evolves into the driving 
force of a riot may contribute to the decision-making process of emergency managers in 
whether to use escalation or de-escalation measures. 
Meyers-Montgomery (2016) suggested that there is a link between the 
“militarized” response of police to “unpermitted protests” and an aggressive mindset. 
Meyers-Montgomery stated that unpermitted protests are a challenge of police authority 
and control and because of this, police leadership encourages a militaristic response 
which involves the use of specialized weapons and tactics. Meyers-Montgomery suggests 
that “unpermitted” protestors have a right to peacefully assemble and that it is the 
presence of militarized police which is the trigger point or spark that creates the riot 
situation. Meyers-Montgomery suggests that police intervention in “unpermitted 
protests” is a social problem where citizens cannot express their “social dissent”. If 
Meyers-Montgomery is to be considered correct and the mere presence of police is the 
trigger point of many riots, the deployment of riot control resources would fall within the 
de-escalation decisions that should be considered by policy officials. The author suggests 
that the more militaristic looking a police force is in response to an event, the greater the 
propensity for civil rights violations and police brutality. 
Economic conditions. Economic conditions contribute to civil disturbances as an 
underlying factor in justifying protests and the actions of protestors. The mass migration 
of African-Americans from the south to the large northern cities after World War II as an 
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example, has contributed to overcrowded cities with increasing poverty and a lack of jobs 
for its residents. The literature which has been examined is consistent in the fact the riots 
of the 1960s and to the present day are exacerbated by the individual, who is lacking in 
wealth or opportunity and a perpetual feeling of hopelessness. 
On July 28, 1967, President Lyndon Johnson established the Kerner Commission 
after violent riots in numerous cities across America in that summer of 1967, most 
prominently in Newark, New Jersey and Detroit, Michigan. The commission examined; 
what happened, why and how could they be prevented in the future. In examining the 
“why” of the report, several areas were examined, unemployment, family structure, social 
disorganization and living conditions within the African-American community (Kerner 
Commission, 1968). The Kerner Commission report was conducted by interviewing the 
participants of the numerous riots it was investigating. The commission described the 
rioter as an African-American male, 15-24 years of age, with limited education (some 
high school), making low wages in menial or low-skilled jobs that may not be steady (not 
full-time and subject to layoffs) and felt a sense of despair due to the lack of opportunity 
from a discriminatory employer (p. 75).   
Spilerman (1970) examined 341 separate riot events from 1961 to 1968 in the 
African-American communities across the country to account for disorder-proneness. The 
variables examined included a lack of social integration, exclusion from the political 
process and the sense of desperation in achieving goals. Promises from the federal 
government to improve the African-American community’s economic conditions have 
been met by indecision, failed initiatives and betrayal only add to their despair (p. 646). 
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Spilerman concluded that the propensity for violence was not attributed to the 
community, but to the individual, suggesting the larger the population the greater the 
likelihood of disorder (p. 645).  
Scacco (2010) examined riots in Nigeria and makes the argument that poverty 
increases the potential for individuals to participate in riots if they are with others of 
similar standing. It is suggested that an individual poverty and social networks increase 
the probability of his/her participation once a riot occurs due to their socially vulnerable 
status.  
Morrell et al. (2011) in a report prepared for the Cabinet Office in Great Britain 
examined the 2011 riots in that country. Like their counterparts in the United States, the 
rioters across Great Britain blamed their involvement on economic and societal issues. 
Rioters explained that looting was due to a lack of income, job opportunities which added 
to a feeling of despair and the lack of belonging to society. 
Simpkin and Sapsed (2012) also examined why the English riots of 2011 occurred 
and that commonalties between the many areas which experienced those events. Among 
the variables that they examined included crime, unemployment and education and were 
defined as predictors. Simpkin and Sapsed (2012) research also considered the 
opportunistic criminals in riots but provided a “liberal” view of riot causes due to socio-
economic reasons, such as low standards of living, high unemployment, the 
disillusionment of young people. 
Social issues. Social issues in relationship to civil disturbances are often long 
simmering systemic issues such as race relations, mistreatment of African-Americans by 
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law enforcement and feelings of hopelessness in African-American communities. Olzak 
and Shanahan (1996) suggest that deprivation in the African-American community is not 
found in a growing black underclass but one of competition from local demographics and 
unemployment which contributes to riots. 
Brown (2017) compares the social conditions in the aftermath of the Watts (Los 
Angeles, California) Riots of 1965 and the Ferguson, Missouri riots of 2014. In each 
event, a violent encounter with law enforcement is suggested as the trigger point for the 
subsequent rioting. Brown states that even though each event is fifty years apart, the same 
social conditions still exist. Brown references The Clark Report (1965) in describing 
conditions after the Watts Riot as hopeless and one of despair among the Los Angeles 
African-American community resulting from unemployment, poor education, and hostile 
police-community relations.  
In the examination of the Ferguson Riot of 2014, Brown describes the social 
conditions in the leadup to the shooting of an African-American man by a white police 
officer. In the immediate aftermath of the shooting, residents began to violently protest 
and loot local stores, but order was quickly restored by a strong law enforcement 
presence. Several months after the initial shooting event, a Grand Jury failed to indict the 
police officer involved based on the evidence in the case, but residents saw this as just 
another example of law enforcement violence against African-Americans. As a result, a 
full-blown riot including looting, arson and shootings erupted in Ferguson. Because of 
the allegations of oppression of the Ferguson African-American community by the 
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Ferguson Police Department, the United States Department of Justice found that a pattern 
of constitutional violations (Brown, 2017).   
In the intervening years between the Watts Riot of 1965 and the Ferguson Riot of 
2014, the United States did not go without rioting. The 1980s were exemplified by 
Miami, Florida which experienced three riots and in 1992, Los Angeles was once again in 
the spotlight with the Rodney King Riots. 
In the 1980s, Miami experienced numerous riots after incidents involving police 
officers and African-Americans. In 1980, the McDuffie Riots, occurred after an African-
American motorist Arthur McDuffie, died after being beaten by police for a traffic 
violation. In 1982, an African-American man was killed by a Miami Police Officer in an 
arcade after being stopped for suspected drug possession. In 1989, a Miami Police 
Officer shot an African-American man who was fleeing from police on a motorcycle. 
These events acted as “triggers” for underlying social issues such as race relations, 
unemployment and immigration in Miami, which exploded into riots. Two factors which 
are related with respect to Miami are unemployment and the influx of Cuban and Haitian 
immigrants into the community, which many African-American consider as a major 
reason for unemployment. The lack of commitment to the African-American community 
after the 1980 McDuffie Riot was shown by local officials after monies which were 
promised to the community’s redevelopment, were spent on projects outside the 
neighborhoods affected by the rioting. These and other factors contribute to a pessimism 
in the Miami African-American community that there is no hope of success (Corwin, 
1993).  
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The City of Los Angeles experienced more rioting in 1992 after the acquittal of 
white police officers in the beating of Rodney King which became known as the Rodney 
King Riots. DiPasqualea & Glaeser (1998) examined the 1992 Los Angeles Riots for the 
variables of unemployment, poverty and social responsibilities. The authors found that 
most rioters in the 1992 Los Angeles Riots were African-American, between the ages of 
16 to 30, and an unemployment rate of twenty-five percent (p. 70). Poverty rates in Los 
Angeles were found to be lower versus other urban areas across the nation. Lastly, the 
authors found that a large percentage of households in the African-American community 
of South Central, Los Angeles, over thirty-five percent, were headed by a female, which 
was higher than other urban areas across the nation (p. 73). South Central Los Angeles 
also experienced a shift in population demographics with whites moving out and being 
replaced with Hispanics and Asians which is similar to Miami’s influx of Cubans and 
Caribbean immigrants (p. 73).  
Conclusion 
Politics or political activity for better or worse is intertwined in everything that we 
do as a society, from political power grabs, to political correctness and social justice. The 
literature describes the concept of Political Opportunity Structure (POS) which 
encourages political activity and protest. The literature examined historical riots of 1967 
in Detroit, Michigan where residents used the simple threat of violence in pressuring 
politicians to respond to the needs of the African-American community. The tactics used 
by police have also been called into question in how a response to a riot is executed. 
Anti-police rioters have suggested that the police have become too militaristic in their 
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appearance, tactics and weaponry that they use. The after-action report of the United 
States Department of Justice (DOJ) to the Ferguson, Missouri riots of 2014, found that 
the police “militaristic look” and use of canine units, when examined through the lens of 
race, raised tensions between the community and the police (Institute for 
Intergovernmental Research, 2015) (United States Department of Justice, Civil Rights 
Division, 2015). Meyers-Montgomery (2016) suggests similar points of contention as that 
of the DOJ report on the Ferguson, Missouri riots of 2014. The author suggests that the 
more aggressive the response of police, the more likelihood that civil rights violations 
and police brutality will occur. POS and its openness may be the perfect avenue of some 
jurisdictions set on social change, as Hahn (1970) suggested, to address issues locally, 
which in choosing a de-escalation avenue, allow a riot to go unchallenged to further that 
social change. 
In examining the many reasons for the causes of riots, there are similar if not 
universal reasons that can be associated with them. In examining the literature of the last 
half century, researchers have consistently linked the variables associated with low 
income, unemployment and a feeling of despair as “reasons” for rioting. The literature 
contained a cross-section of examples from countries in three different continents, all 
with similar types of causation associated with how riots may have started. While 
opportunistic individuals are present in many of the different riot locations, the causation 
for why riots started returns to the socioeconomic levels in each community which 
experienced a riot, as a way of excusing the behavior.  
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In the “Political Opportunity Structure” (POS) described by Dalton et al. (2010) 
political activity and protest is encouraged. The question must be asked of decision 
makers, would a de-escalation decision be made to not engage protestors, thus allowing 
protests, similar to what Piven and Cloward (2011) proposed in their strategy to effect 
social changes, such as collapsing the federal welfare system, forcing all persons to be 
paid a guaranteed annual income. 
The literature provides a constant theme of despair for the African-American 
community and the ability of those to fulfill any dreams and aspirations they may have. 
Frustrations build to explosive situations and are “triggered” by events which bring these 
feelings to the forefront via the violent means of rioting. 
Dependent Variables 
Dependent variables are defined by Creswell (2013) “as those variables which are 
dependent upon independent variable for influences and outcomes” (p. 50). The 
dependent variables that will be utilized in this study will include the types of responses, 
aggressive (escalation) or non-aggressive (de-escalation) to civil disturbances. The type 
of decision made by emergency managers, may make the difference in an incident such 
as civil protest turning into a riot or maintaining the normalcy of a community. Law 
enforcement is allowed, although it may be varied by jurisdiction, to use force to either 
maintain the peace (normalcy) of a community or return it from a state of chaos. It is the 
decisions of whether to use non-aggressive actions to deescalate the situation or continue 
the standard aggressive escalation responses currently in use. 
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De-escalation. The use of force by law enforcement is legally authorized as a 
measure of enforcing lawful orders to either maintain or restore order (Price et al., 2015), 
while de-escalation is the use of nonphysical methods to manage violence or aggression 
in a person (Kesic, et al., 2013). De-escalation is defined by the Meriam-Webster 
dictionary (2017); “to decrease in extent, volume, or scope”. Simonson and Staw (1992) 
define de-escalation as the lessening of the “variables or forces that have been shown 
previously to underlie escalation tendencies” (p.1). In the mental health field, de-
escalation techniques are utilized as non-physical methods of dealing with a violent or 
aggressive patient (Price et al., 2015).  
Escalation. Escalation from a project management point of view, is described by 
Curseu et al. (2016) as an Escalation of Commitment (EOC), that is, an over investment 
in one’s resources. This is applicable in understanding the theory of this research and 
determining if de-escalation is needed in civil disturbances because of an un-needed 
deployment of resources, to what may be a peaceful protest, to only have it escalate as 
Simonson and Staw (1992) suggested. Meyers-Montgomery (2016) defines escalation as 
the “militarization” of the law enforcement response “by masked and heavily armed 
police officers” (p.1).  
Newburn (2015) in a comparison of cities in Great Britain utilizes the “flashpoint 
model” to examine “why riots don’t happen” in some cities and not in others. The 
flashpoint model examines the role of police and their tactics and how this can affect a 
crowd’s motivations, to either behave responsibly or erupt in violence, in accordance 
with the chaos theory. The response by law enforcement to disturbances which may have 
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not yet escalated into a full-blown civil disturbance or riot, is also a critical factor which 
are determined by the dependent variables of escalation or de-escalation. As described by 
Miller (2001) the decision to escalate or de-escalate have resulted in major incidents such 
as the “Watts Riots” which occurred in the summer of 1965 in Los Angeles, California. 
After a minor arrest confrontation between bystanders and members of the California 
Highway Patrol (CHP), a bystander spat on one of the CHP officers, which resulted in the 
decision to escalate by the officers, by wading into the crowd and arresting the offenders. 
The alternative decision involving de-escalation would have been to ignore the incident 
and simply withdraw and avoid the confrontation. This escalation decision caused the 
incident to explode into one of the worst riots in American history, resulting in thirty-four 
deaths, over one-thousand people being injured and damages in excess of forty million 
dollars  
Based on the premise of the chaos theory and the expected linear progression of 
an incident, the results of the decision process and the selection of escalation or de-
escalation methods will determine if chaos emerges or normalcy is maintained. 
Conclusion 
The study utilizes three independent variables, to examine underlying causes of a 
disturbance and two dependent variables, aggressive (escalation) or non-aggressive (de-
escalation) to determine responses. The literature has shown that civil disturbances begin 
as small benign events which grow into larger more complex disturbances or riots, 
because of the decisions to use aggressive rather than non-aggressive methods. De-
escalation exists in the fields of psychology and the treatment of the mentally ill and 
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verbal techniques to control aggressive persons. Escalation methods are being examined 
in the context of not “over committing” to a situation, adjusting responses by law 
enforcement through not deploying forces to relieve underlying tensions and by 
demilitarizing response forces. Decisions which are made using the de-escalation and 
escalation will be important to how the status of a civil disturbance evolves in accordance 
with chaos theory.  
Gap in Previous Research 
In researching the current literature into de-escalation techniques several 
examples exist for treating the mentally ill, the use of force by police and verbal de-
escalation measures were found, but none which were applicable to civil disturbances. A 
research project regarding de-escalation methods comes from the medical community and 
was targeted at the treatment of the mentally ill, but only those involving verbal methods 
(Kesic, Thomas, & Ogloff, 2013). In a survey conducted by Mills and Ivacko (2016) for 
the University of Michigan’s Gerald R. Ford School of Public Policy, civil disturbances 
that resulted from an act of excessive force by a local law enforcement officer were 
examined, but there was no correlation with the need for de-escalation techniques in 
responding to them. As previously mentioned, Simonson and Staw (1992) suggested that 
de-escalation could be accomplished by simply relieving escalation forces, for research of 
an economic or logistical context, but once again there was no direct correlation to the 
whether such techniques had been applied to civil disturbances. Morrell and Curie (2015) 
use the concept of “impossible jobs” from Hargrove and Glidewell’s Impossible Jobs in 
Public Management (1990) and apply it to riot policing in the United Kingdom, to 
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examine how officers train for and manage riots. The study while examining the actions 
(escalations) of police during a riot, does not address the need for the application of de-
escalation techniques at the beginning of an incident. 
Conclusion 
The response to civil disturbances in a historical context has been one of an 
aggressive manner utilizing federal troops, militarized law enforcement, dogs and fire 
hoses. In trying to find alternatives to aggressive responses by authorities to an incident 
which has already exploded to a stage which the only possible response is an aggressive 
one. By examining non-aggressive responses, de-escalating a situation, it is hoped that 
alternatives can be found to the aggressive response. In order to achieve this, theoretical 
frameworks such as the chaos theory, the strain theory and BDT, may allow for a 
comprehensive approach to an incident before it spirals out of control from a harmless 
protest into a full-scale riot. 
Previous research identified in de-escalation, has been limited to the mentally ill, 
riot response research and riot management. The research concerning escalation measures 
include poor decision-making, failed courses of action, outdated policies and methods 
(Einhorn & Hogarth, 1981). The literature researched in this study unfortunately, does 
not address whether there is a need for new measures or if there have ever been any 
attempts to apply them to the phenomenon known as the civil disturbance. Emergency 
managers should consider the underlying issues (independent variables) when creating a 
response to a looming civil disturbance event to see if alternative nonaggressive methods 
may be practical or if current aggressive practices should be employed. Therefore, this 
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study will examine the potential need for changes in response policies by using de-
escalation techniques in civil disturbances.  
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Chapter 3: Research Method 
Introduction 
The following chapter explains the quantitative methodology employed in this 
study in obtaining the opinions of law enforcement and emergency management officials 
whether de-escalation techniques are needed in the response to civil disturbances. For this 
study, a cross-sectional design was used to quantify the opinions and attitudes of 
emergency management officials about the need for de-escalation techniques in civil 
disturbances. The target population consisted of a sampling frame of law enforcement 
and emergency management officials who are responsible for the decision-making 
authority with regards to civil disturbances or riots within their communities. To extract 
the responses of the target population, a probability sampling method was used; 
specifically, a random survey of law enforcement and emergency management 
population at one particular place in time using a survey instrument distributed to the 
previously mentioned public officials.  
Problem Statement 
As stated in Chapter 1, historically speaking, the responses to civil disturbances or 
riots have been aggressive shows and uses of force, or escalation. These aggressive 
shows of force have included tactics such as the use of police dogs (Maurantonio, 2014), 
armed federal troops (Steidl, 2013), and police field forces to restore normalcy or prevent 
chaos (Miller, 2001). The individuals who are responsible for how responses to civil 
disturbances are decided should, as a general rule, seek de-escalation rather than 
confrontation.  
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Decision-makers should always be mindful of the repercussions that their 
decisions can have on their communities like destruction and chaos, due to escalating an 
event unnecessarily versus de-escalating it. One such example of inadvertently escalating 
a situation would be to deploy resources, instead of holding back or staging them away 
from the situation in the hope of diffusing it. Simonson and Staw (1992) suggest that de-
escalation techniques may provide law enforcement and emergency management officials 
a reference point to avoid the commitment of resources and escalation. 
Therefore, in this study, I sought to determine whether there is a need for de-
escalation techniques to be incorporated into policies and response protocols or if law 
enforcement and emergency management officials should maintain current response 
protocols that may escalate the situation. 
The contribution of this study to the current knowledge base is whether changes 
in civil disturbance response protocols using de-escalation techniques benefit decision 
makers and provide a social impact to the community through the lessening of 
destruction and violence during an incident. 
Research Design 
For this research, I used a cross-sectional design to randomly sample law 
enforcement and emergency management officials who are responsible for the decision-
making policies for civil disturbances. A cross-sectional design allows for those being 
sampled to express their own opinions, attitudes, or beliefs to a survey question based on 
experiences, and background. Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias (2008) suggested that 
the cross-sectional design is the most used in the social sciences and allows for the 
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identification and description of any patterns between the variables in the study. The 
survey method used in the collection of data involved a self-administered questionnaire 
through the internet survey collection service, Survey Monkey 
(https://www.surveymonkey.com). 
Levels of Measurement 
The target population was law enforcement and emergency management officials, 
who operate daily in a high-pressure decision-making and consequence-based results due 
often to politically charged variables outside of their control. Because of their 
commitment to the safety of the public, there is also a professional presence that may 
override political expediency or agendas in their decision-making, which keeps their 
communities from falling into chaos or helps to quickly return normalcy. The survey 
questioned decision makers about community conditions such as politics, economics, or 
social conditions and if they influenced how they would respond to a civil disturbance.  
The levels of measurement for this study included nominal and ordinal scale 
levels. To establish impartiality in the data, I used the nominal level to categorize, job 
titles, authority, and other characteristics of the emergency management field, whereas 
the ordinal level was utilized to measure the greater than relation in the data, such as 
opinions of politics, the degree of external influence and the need for change 
Target Population and Sample 
The target population of this research included a homogenous sample of law 
enforcement and emergency management officials who are responsible for responding to 
and making policy for a jurisdiction’s decision-making rationale during the time of a civil 
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emergency. I conducted the research among agencies in the South Florida area, which 
was selected because of historical rioting and civil disturbances in that area. Past 
experiences include the Miami Riots of 1980, 1982, and 1989 which were the results of 
confrontations with police officers (Mohl, 1990), and the Free Trade Agreement of the 
Americas protests of 2003 (Wainwright and Ortiz, 2006), where planned protests were 
“hijacked” by agitators. The sample reflected a collection of participants who best 
represent, through experience and knowledge, an understanding of the workings of civil 
disturbances or riots. The sample size was comprised of 25participants from among law 
enforcement and emergency management officials. The survey of these officials was 
conducted to prompt opinions about the feasibility of the use of de-escalation techniques 
in civil disturbances. Participants were selected to obtain a varied cross-section of the 
population (e.g., ages, grades, or years of experience; Mills, Durepos, & Wiebe, 2010). 
Sampling Procedures 
The sampling procedures employed in the collection of data consisted of 
identifying a homogenous group of law enforcement and emergency managers in a major 
South Florida county and inviting them to participate in the completion of a survey via 
Survey Monkey. Because the survey was online, participants remained anonymous 
throughout the survey process. 
Instrumentation 
The survey instrument I designed and constructed to use in the data collection for 
was based on the Ethics Position Questionnaire (EPQ), which was developed by Forsyth 
(1980a). The EPQ is comprised of 20 questions that are based on commonly held 
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opinions or morals found in the general public. Using the EPQ framework, I developed 
survey questions based on five statements. The full EPQ is attached in Appendix A. 
(Forsyth, 1980b). The statements that were the basis for my survey questions are as 
follows:    
1. One should not perform an action which might in any way threaten the dignity 
and welfare of another individual. 
2. If an action could harm an innocent other, then it should not be done. 
3. The dignity and welfare of people should be the most important concern in 
any society. 
4. Questions of what is ethical for everyone can never be resolved since what is 
moral or immoral is up to the individual. 
5. Rigidly codifying an ethical position that prevents certain types of actions 
could stand in the way of better human relations and adjustment. (Forsyth, 
1980) 
The survey and questions were designed to extract the opinions of the need for de-
escalation techniques in civil disturbances. The survey questions utilized a Yes/No 
format, along with follow-up questions using a Likert Scale to expand on those questions 
which are answered in the affirmative.  
A multiple-choice survey was used as the measurement instrument for my 
research. The research surveyed the respondents with such factors as yes/no, agreement, 
values (relevance and frequency), importance, and likelihood scales. The multiple-choice 
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survey instrument contained questions answerable through the selection of a response 
which was coded with symbols to capture the survey answers.  
In the following sample question, the respondent is asked a yes/no question which 
were captured by a multiple-choice survey in Survey Monkey. Prior to the start of the 
survey participants must first acknowledge the survey consent form. The respondent then 
answers the questions in order until all are answered.  
Survey Questions 
1. Which discipline do you most closely align your duties? 
a. Emergency Management 
b. Law Enforcement 
2. What is your experience (in years) in this position? 
a. 0 - 5 years 
b. 5 - 10 years 
c. 10 - 15 years 
d. 15 – 20 years 
e. More than 20 years 
3. Has your jurisdiction experienced a civil disturbance and how would it be 
characterized? Yes/No 
a. No, my jurisdiction has not experienced a civil disturbance. 
b. Yes, Permitted protests 
c. Yes, Unpermitted protests  
d. Yes, Spontaneous (e.g. response to a championship win by a sports team)  
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e. Yes, Full-scale riots 
4. Have you ever participated in the response to a civil disturbance? Yes/No  
a. No, I have never participated in the response to a civil disturbance. 
b. Yes, Permitted protests 
c. Yes, Unpermitted protests  
d. Yes, Spontaneous (e.g. response to a championship win by a sports team)  
e. Yes, Full-scale riots  
5. Have you ever planned for a response to a civil disturbance? Yes/No  
a. No, I have never participated in the response to a civil disturbance. 
b. Yes, Permitted protests 
c. Yes, Unpermitted protests  
d. Yes, Spontaneous (e.g. response to a championship win by a sports team)  
e. Yes, Full-scale riots 
6. Have you ever been in the position of decision making during a civil 
disturbance? Yes/No  
a. No, I have not been in the position of decision making during a civil 
disturbance. 
b. Yes, Permitted protests 
c. Yes, Unpermitted protests  
d. Yes, Spontaneous (e.g. response to a championship win by a sports team)  
e. Yes, Full-scale riots  
40 
 
7. Does your agency have a plan or policies in place to address civil 
disturbances? Yes/No 
a. No, my agency does not have a plan or policies in place to address civil 
disturbances. 
b. Yes, my agency does have a plan or policies in place to address civil 
disturbances, but, has not incorporated de-escalation techniques. 
c. Yes, my agency does have a plan or policies in place to address civil 
disturbances and has incorporated de-escalation techniques. 
8. The Chaos Theory as it applies to emergency management, implies that an 
emergency manager should try to maintain normalcy or return to normalcy 
from chaos as quickly as possible, in order to reduce or avoid violence and 
destruction. Which would you consider the proper type of response to a civil 
disturbance in either maintaining or returning to normalcy? 
a. Aggressive 
b. Passive 
9. In your opinion do you think that considerations regarding social and 
economic conditions or political activity, should be given to a situation when 
deciding which type of a response to a civil disturbance is conducted, e.g. 
aggressive or passive? 
a. Yes 
b. No  
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10. In your opinion, do the current tactics used in the response to civil 
disturbances need updating? 
a. Yes 
b. No 
11. How effective do you think de-escalation techniques would be if they were 
made a part of response protocols, to reduce or prevent violence during a civil 
disturbance? 
a. Effective 
b. No Difference 
c. Ineffective 
12. In your opinion, is there a need for the use of de-escalation techniques in civil 
disturbances? 
a. Yes  
b. No 
The null hypothesis for each is that no such positive relationship exists. 
Reliability 
In determining if any errors in validity have occurred, making sure that the 
reliability of the survey being completed is crucial to the research. The entire 
measurement process must be controlled, and its integrity guarded, from the collection of 
data to its presentation in the report, for a confidence in the measurement instrument and 
those reading the report (Staron & Meding, 2009). Emergency Management is a 
unchanging process of functions, preparation, response, recovery and mitigation, which 
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are learned through training and experience. The Emergency Management field has also 
had standardization applied within it such as the National Incident Management System 
(NIMS) and the National Response Framework (NRF) which allows for a nationwide 
approach to restoring order from chaos. By applying the measurement instrument within 
the emergency management field, reliability and consistency would be ensured, because 
of national standardization, retain its stability over time when used in future surveys 
when replicated regardless of where it may be used. By applying the measurement 
instrument only within the would ensure reliability (Dantzker and Hunter, 2006). 
Validity  
Validity is measuring what is intended to be measured (Frankfort-Nachmias & 
Nachmias, 2008). To establish validity, this research will use a homogeneous group of 
participants from the public safety field (law enforcement and emergency managers) with 
actual or preparation experience in civil disturbances. Maxwell (2012) stated, the validity 
standard requires the testing of data against the real-world (p. 122). It is the belief of this 
researcher that the data in this research when tested against the real world, would easily 
achieved validity by the interviewing of another sample of public safety officials with 
similar experiences in civil disturbances from another jurisdiction in the United States.  
The Ethics Position Questionnaire (EPQ) was examined for validity and reliability 
in a research study by Yazici and Yazici (2010). The study concluded that the EPQ would 
be satisfactory for social scientists to utilize while examining individuals and the various 
settings that they can be found in. 
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Chapter 4: Results  
Introduction 
Historically, civil disturbances have been responded to in an aggressive manner 
using military troops, a “militarized” response by police, and aggressive tactics such as 
police dogs and water cannons. The purpose of this study was to examine the hypothesis 
of whether current responses by government officials are no longer practical when 
applied to civil disturbances or riots and if there a need for de-escalation techniques.  
I designed the study from four research questions to identify the types of 
disturbances respondents might have experienced, the presence of plans and policies they 
may or may not have for responding to them, decision-making factors, and the type of 
response they would utilize. The four questions were as follows: 
RQ1. Would the lack of experience versus actual experience influence the type of 
response action taken?  
RQ2. Would training, policies, biases or external stimuli, influence the type of 
response action taken? 
RQ3. Would the influences of politics, economic or social conditions contribute 
to the decision-making factors, such as to respond passively or aggressively?  
RQ4. Would the inclusion techniques such as de-escalation contribute positively 
in maintaining order in a community? 
In the survey both emergency managers and law enforcement officials were asked 
about their backgrounds and personal experiences regarding participation, planning, and 
decision-making for civil disturbances. Participants were also surveyed as to whether 
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they have or would consider factors such as training, policy, biases, or external 
influences, such as underlying political, economic or social conditions of communities, in 
their response to an incident. Participants were also asked their opinions on the type of 
response they preferred (aggressive or passive), and lastly, the need to update tactics 
used, the effectiveness of those changes in tactics would be, and need for the use of de-
escalation techniques in civil disturbances.    
In this chapter, I will present the features of the target population, a 
comprehensive discussion of each question and the data collected in the survey, the 
conclusions of the study based on a cross-tabulation analyses, additional comments based 
on the survey data, and a summary of the key findings. 
Data Collection 
The target population of this study is a homogenous sample of law enforcement 
and emergency management officials responsible for policy or response decisions 
regarding civil disturbances, in a major county in the South Florida area with a 
population of more than 1.5 million people (United States Census Bureau, 2010) and 31 
incorporated towns or cities. I chose this population due to South Florida’s historical 
experiences with rioting and civil disturbances.  
The chief law enforcement officers and emergency managers from the 31 
incorporated municipalities of the county are the target of the survey population. I 
identified these participants through open source internet searches at each of the 
jurisdiction’s websites and/or searches of the desired position (emergency manager and 
police chief) from the internet. It should be noted that, because of contractual 
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arrangements, some of the jurisdictions do not have personnel who hold the title of 
emergency manager and police chief, but who still perform those duties in differently 
titled positions, in those jurisdictions with whom they contract.  
This county and its public safety structure is unique in that Sheriff’s Office and 
several jurisdictions within the county have entered into contractual agreements to 
provide law enforcement and fire services from a county level (Sheriff’s Office) and a 
peer-to-peer level (city to city). The presence of these agreements contributes to a 
reduction in the number of positions by jurisdictions to reduce costs and duplication of 
effort, which affected the sample size. The inclusion of fire services is important to this 
research with regards to the target population, because the function of emergency 
management is generally located within the fire department.   
The following is an example of the county public safety structure. The sheriff’s 
office contracts and provides a combination of law enforcement and fire rescue services 
to 14 of the 31 jurisdictions, plus the seaport and airport. Of the 14 jurisdictions in which 
the sheriff’s office provides services, 10 contracts for both law enforcement and fire 
services, while the other four either provide their own services or contract with another 
jurisdiction for their fire services. The remaining 17 jurisdictions are not associated with 
the sheriff’s office in providing law enforcement or fire services. Regardless of the 
contractual status of any of the jurisdictions, there are still those who fill the position of 
chief law enforcement officer and emergency manager, who are the target population of 
this research. 
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The original data collection plan for this study called for the data to be collected 
via an interview process and the completion of a survey. Instead, the collection process 
was conducted via the internet survey collection service, Survey Monkey 
(https://www.surveymonkey.com), which allowed for the creation and distribution of the 
survey to the participants. This process allowed for convenience, timeliness, and 
anonymity for the participants of the survey. Survey Monkey also provides collection and 
analysis tools for the data obtained from the respondents. I contacted the respondents 
selected to participate in the survey via e-mail inviting them to participate with a link to 
the survey. 
When counting each of the 31 jurisdictions and allowing for a participant from 
each discipline, emergency management and law enforcement, the total number of 
participants would be 62. The goal of this research was to receive a response from at least 
20% of those 62, which would equal 12.4 participants. I rounded that number up to 15 to 
increase the validity of the survey.  
Study Results 
Data collection occurred over a period of 14 days, from July 20, 2018 through 
August 2, 2018, at which time the total number of participants sought was achieved. The 
survey is provided as Appendix B. A total of 26 participants responded to the survey, 
with one response being incomplete. The incomplete response was discarded. 
The study results were divided into two categories, raw data and cross-tabulation 
data. I used the cross-tabulation analysis to gather the respondents’ opinions based on 
their respective disciplines and experiences among the different factors contained in the 
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survey questions. Those factors included training, policies, biases or external stimuli 
(political, economic, or social conditions), and what type of response they believed would 
be appropriate for a civil disturbance, aggressive or passive. The raw data is presented in 
Tables 1 to 11 and the cross-tabulation data is presented in Tables 12 to 19. 
Primary Survey Data 
Respondent Demographics 
This section of the study results will address the respondent demographics, the 
discipline that they mostly closely align with, emergency management or law 
enforcement, and the years of experience each has in those disciplines.  
The survey received 25 respondents, of whom 18 (72%) were from law 
enforcement and 7 (28%) were from emergency management. Table 1 shows a cross-
tabulation of the disciplines and the years of experience from each respondent. The 
results show that law enforcement respondents had more overall years of experience 
versus the respondents of the emergency management discipline.  
Table 1 
 
Respondent Experience 
Disciplines < 5 yrs % 5 - 10 yrs % 10-15 yrs % 15-20 yrs % > 20 yrs % n % 
 Emergency management  1 4 1 4 1 4 2 8 2 8 7 28 
Law enforcement  0 0 0 0 1 4 1 4 16 64 18 72 
Total (n = 25)  1 4 1 4 2 8 3 12 18 72 25 100 
 
Jurisdictional Characteristics 
Tables 2 and 3 show the characteristics of the respondents’ jurisdiction with 
regards to their experiences with various types of civil disturbances and whether the 
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jurisdiction has plans or policies in place to address them. Table 2 shows the types of 
civil disturbances that have occurred in a respondent’s jurisdiction and how these 
disturbances are characterized. Four respondents 16% responded that their jurisdiction 
had never experienced a civil disturbance, eight respondents (32%) had experienced 
permitted protests, seven respondents (28%) unpermitted protests, five respondents 
(20%) spontaneous protests and only one respondent had experienced a full-scale riot. 
 
Table 2. 
 
Has your jurisdiction experienced a civil disturbance and how would it be characterized? 
 
Table 3 shows the status of the respondent’s agency and whether it has a plan or 
policies in place to address civil disturbances. Of the 25 responses received, only 2 (8%) 
respondents, did not have an agency plan or policies in place to address a civil 
disturbance, while 3 (12%) did have plans and policies in place, but had not incorporated 
de-escalation techniques to address civil disturbances. The remaining 20 (80%) 
Categories 
Emergency 
management % 
Law 
enforcement % n % 
 No, my jurisdiction has not 
     experienced a civil 
disturbance 
1 4 3 12 4 16 
Yes, permitted protests 3 12 5 20 8 32 
Yes, unpermitted protests 2 8 5 20 7 28 
Yes, spontaneous (e.g. 
response to 
     a championship win by a  
     sports team) 
0 0 5 20 5 20 
   
Yes, full-scale riots 1 4 0 0 1 4 
Total (n = 25) 7 28 18 72 25 100 
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respondents affirmed that they have incorporated de-escalation techniques into their plans 
and policies to address responses to civil disturbances. 
Table 3. 
 
Does your agency have a plan or policies in place to address civil disturbances? 
 
Respondent Experience 
Tables 4, 5, and 6 show the level of a respondent’s personal and planning 
experiences and decision-making criterion they would utilize in civil disturbances.  
Table 4 shows the individual participatory experiences of all the respondents and 
how they are characterized. Seven (28%) respondents stated that they had never 
participated a civil disturbance. In examining the remaining characteristics, six or 24% of 
respondents stated that they had participated in permitted protests, five or 20%, 
Categories Emergency management % 
Law 
enforcement % n % 
 No, my agency does not 
     have a plan or policies in 
     place to address civil 
     disturbances 
 
2 8 0 0 2 8 
Yes, my agency does have 
     a plan/policies to address  
     civil disturbances, but  
     has not incorporated  
     de-escalation techniques 
 
1 4 2 8 3 12 
Yes, my agency does have 
     a plan/policies to address  
     civil disturbances and 
     has incorporated  
     de-escalation techniques 
 
4 
1
6 
16 64 20 80 
Total (n = 25) 
 
7 
2
8 
18 72 25 100 
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unpermitted protests, three or 12%, spontaneous protests (e.g. Response to a 
Championship Win by a Sports Team) and four or 16%, in a full-scale riot.  
Table 4. 
 
Respondent Participation Experience in Civil Disturbances 
The study results found that law enforcement respondents had five times more 
people, with at least some civil disturbance participation experience over emergency 
management respondents. In the four categories excluding “having never participated in 
the response to a civil disturbance”, 15 (60%) of the law enforcement respondents had 
some sort of experience versus just three (12%) for emergency management. 
Table 5 shows the individual planning experiences of all the respondents and how 
they are characterized. Seven (28%) respondents stated that they had never planned a 
civil disturbance. In examining the remaining characteristics, seven (28%) of respondents 
stated that they had planned for permitted protests, five (20%), for unpermitted protests, 
Categories Emergency management % Law enforcement % n % 
 No, I have never 
     participated in the 
     response to a civil 
     disturbance 
 
4 16 3 12 7 28 
Yes, permitted protests  1 4 5 20 6 24 
Yes, unpermitted protests  1  4 4 16 5 20 
Yes, spontaneous (e.g. 
     response to a 
     championship win by  
     a sports team) 
 
0 0 3 12 3 12 
Yes, full-scale riots  1 4 3 12 4 16 
Total (n = 25)  7 28 18 72 25 100 
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one (4%), for spontaneous protests (e.g. Response to a Championship Win by a Sports 
Team) and five (20%), for full-scale riots. 
Table 5. 
 
Respondent Planning Experience in Civil Disturbances 
The results found that law enforcement respondents as with the participation 
aspect above, had five times more people, with at least some civil disturbance planning 
experience over emergency management respondents. In the four categories excluding 
“having never planned for the response to a civil disturbance”, 15 (60%) of law 
enforcement had some sort of experience versus just three (12%) for emergency 
management.   
Table 6 shows the individual decision-making criterion of all the respondents and 
how they are characterized. nine (36%) respondents stated that they had never been 
involved in the decision-making processes of a civil disturbance. In examining the 
remaining characteristics, nine (36%) of respondents stated that they had been involved 
in the decision-making processes for a civil disturbance and based those decisions on 
Categories Emergency management % Law enforcement % n % 
 No, I have never planned for a 
       response to a civil disturbance 
 
4 16 3 12 7 28 
Yes, permitted protests  1 4 6 24 7 28 
Yes, unpermitted protests  1  4 4 16 5 20 
Yes, spontaneous (e.g. response to a  
        championship win by a sports 
        team) 
 
0 0 1 4 1 4 
Yes, full-scale riots  1 4 4 16 5 20 
Total (n = 25)  7 28 18 72 25 100 
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training, seven (28%), based their decisions on policies and no respondent made any 
decisions based on external influences or personal biases. 
 
Table 6. 
 
Respondent Decision-Making Criteria in Civil Disturbances 
 
The results found that law enforcement respondents were almost equal in 
personnel who had not been in the position of decision-making during a civil disturbance 
as emergency management respondents, with five and four respectively. In the “training” 
characteristic law enforcement had seven (28%) versus two (8%) emergency 
management respondents, the “policy” characteristic showed that there were six (24%) 
law enforcement versus one (4%) for emergency management. No respondent from either 
discipline made any decisions based on external influences or personal biases. 
Respondent Opinion 
Tables 7 to 11 show respondent opinions regarding the consideration of external 
influencers such as social and economic conditions or political activity, the updating of 
Categories Emergency management % Law enforcement % n % 
 No, I have not been in the 
      position of decision making 
      during a civil disturbance 
 
4 16 5 20 9 36 
Yes, my decisions were based 
      on training 
 
2 8 7 28 9 36 
Yes, my decisions were based 
      on policy 
 
1 4 6 24 7 28 
Yes, my decisions were based 
      on external influences 
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
Yes, my decisions were based 
      on personal biases 
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total (n = 25)  7 28 18 72 25 100 
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tactics, the potential effectiveness, type of response and need for de-escalation techniques 
in civil disturbances. 
Table 7 describes the opinions of respondents as to whether outside influences 
such as social and economic conditions or political activity, are considered in their 
decision-making processes. The results showed that 14 (56%) of all respondents would 
not allow outside influences to play a part in their decision-making processes and 11 
(44%) would consider them. The comparison of disciplines found that eight (32%) of the 
law enforcement respondents and six (24%) emergency management respondents did not 
believe that external influences should be considered as a part of their decision-making 
process. In contrast, 10 (40%) law enforcement and one (4%) emergency management 
respondents, believed that external influences should be considered as a part of their 
decision-making process. 
Table 7. 
 
Should There Be Considerations for External Influencers (social and economic 
conditions or political activity) in the Response to Civil Disturbances? 
 
Table 8 shows the opinions of respondents regarding the need to update current 
tactics used in the response to civil disturbances. Of the responses, 11 (44%) did not 
believe that tactics need to change, while 14 (56%) did believe that current response 
tactics need to be updated.  
Categories Emergency management % Law enforcement % n % 
 No  6 24 8 32 14 56 
Yes  1 4 10 40 11 44 
Total (n = 25)  7 28 18 72 25 100 
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Table 8. 
 
In your opinion, do the current tactics used in the response to civil disturbances need 
updating? 
 
The comparison of disciplines found that nine (36%) law enforcement 
respondents and two (8%) emergency management respondents did not believe that 
current tactics used in the response to civil disturbances need to be updated. In contrast, 
nine (36%) of the law enforcement and five (20%) emergency management respondents, 
believed that response tactics to civil disturbances need to be updated. 
Table 9 shows the opinions of respondents regarding the effectiveness of de-
escalation techniques if used in civil disturbances. Most respondents, 14 (56%) believe 
that de-escalation techniques would be effective in civil disturbances, while eight (32%) 
believe that they would make no difference and three (12%) believed that they would be 
ineffective. 
Table 9. 
 
How effective do you think de-escalation techniques would be if they were made a part of 
response protocols, to reduce or prevent violence during a civil disturbance? 
 
Categories Emergency management % Law enforcement % n % 
 No 2  8 9 36 11  44 
Yes 5  20 9 36 14 56 
Total (n = 25) 7  28 18 72 25 100 
Categories Emergency management % Law enforcement % n % 
 Effective  5 20 9 36 14 56 
No difference  1 4 7 28 8 32 
Ineffective  1 4 2 8 3 12 
Total (n = 25)  7 28 18 72 25 100 
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A comparison of the two groups found that 50% or nine of the law enforcement 
respondents, believed that de-escalation techniques would be effective, while the other 
50% of law enforcement respondents, believed there would be no difference or 
ineffective. In the emergency management group, five believed that de-escalation 
techniques would be effective, while one in each category, believed that de-escalation 
techniques would either make no difference or be ineffective. 
Table 10 shows the opinions of respondents as to which type of response they 
would take to maintain normalcy or return from a state of chaos to normalcy in their 
jurisdiction, with either an aggressive or passive response. 17 (68%) of the respondents 
stated that they would act aggressively, while eight (32%) chose a passive response. 
Table 10. 
 
Which would you consider the proper type of response to a civil disturbance in either 
maintaining or returning to normalcy?  
 
A comparison of the disciplines showed that 13 (52%) law enforcement 
respondents and four (16%) emergency management respondents would act aggressively 
in their jurisdiction to maintain normalcy or return from a state of chaos to normalcy. In 
contrast, five (20%) law enforcement and three (12%) from emergency management 
respondents would respond in a passive manner in their jurisdiction to maintain normalcy 
or return from a state of chaos to normalcy. 
Categories Emergency management % Law enforcement % n % 
 Aggressive  4 16 13 52 17 68 
Passive  3 12 5 20 8 32 
Total (n = 25)  7 28 18 72 25 100 
56 
 
Table 11 shows the respondent’s opinion for the need of de-escalation techniques 
in civil disturbances. The results show that 21 (84%) of respondents believe that there is a 
need to include de-escalation techniques in the response to civil disturbances, while four 
(16%) do not. 
Table 11. 
 
Is There a Need for De-Escalation Techniques in Civil Disturbances? 
 
Law enforcement respondents accounted for 15 (60%) of the 21 affirmative 
responses while emergency management respondents accounted for the other six (24%) 
that there is a need for de-escalation techniques in civil disturbances. Only four 
respondents, three (12%) from law enforcement and one (4%) from emergency 
management did not believe that de-escalation techniques were needed in civil 
disturbances. 
Cross-Tabulation Survey Data 
This research utilized the experiences of respondents from both the law 
enforcement and emergency management disciplines to provide their opinions regarding 
training, policies, biases or external stimuli, (politics, economic or social conditions) and 
what type of response they believed would be proper to a civil disturbance, aggressive or 
passive. To capture these factors, a cross-tabulation analysis was made of the 
Categories 
Emergency 
management % Law enforcement % n % 
 No  1 4 3 12 4 16 
Yes  6 24 15 60 21 84 
Total (n = 25)  7 28 18 72 25 100 
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respondent’s discipline in which they work and their amounts of experience in those 
disciplines, (as shown in Tables 1 and 2) and the remaining survey questions 
individually. The cross-tabulation results are presented in Tables 12 – 19. 
Respondent Demographics 
As stated previously, Survey Questions 1 and 2, were utilized to capture the 
respondent demographic information, the discipline each identified with and the amount 
of experience within it. As described above, there were 18 respondents from the law 
enforcement discipline and seven from the emergency management discipline, for a 72% 
to 28% statistical difference. Table 1 described the experience levels of the respondents. 
The LE discipline had 18 respondents, all of which had more than 10 years of 
experience. Sixteen of the eighteen law enforcement respondents had more than 20 years 
of experience, while one had 10 to 15 years, one with 15 to 20 years of experience, 
respectively and none in the lower two categories. The emergency management discipline 
received seven responses in total, with only four respondents having more than 15 years 
of experience and one in each of the lower experienced categories. 
Table 12 describes the type of response by discipline and experience. Survey 
question #8, asked respondents, what type of response they would take, aggressive or 
passive, to maintain normalcy or restore normalcy according to the chaos theory. It could 
be expected that emergency management respondents may not be as aggressive as their 
law enforcement counterparts, but the results showed that four chose an aggressive 
response action versus three who chose a passive response. The results were very evenly 
split on the type of response regardless of years of experience. Contrary to the emergency 
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management respondents, law enforcement respondents chose an aggressive response 
most notably in the years of experience they had. 11 of the 13 respondents who would 
choose an aggressive response to either maintain normalcy or return to a state of 
normalcy had been in law enforcement more than twenty years, while the other two 
respondents each had more than ten and fifteen years of experience respectively. 
Table 12 
 
Type of Response by Discipline and Experience 
 
The survey results found that as a practical matter, law enforcement, because of 
their primary role in addressing civil disturbances, were the more experienced 
respondents versus emergency managers. The data suggests that an aggressive posture 
while responding to a civil disturbance, based on the years of experience by both law 
enforcement and emergency management, is the preferred manner of response.  
Discipline                                                                 Experience Aggressive % Passive % n % 
 Emergency management < 5 yrs  1 4 0 0 1 4 
5 - 10 yrs  0 0 1 4 1 4 
10-15 yrs  1 4 0 0 1 4 
15 - 20 yrs  1 4 1 4 2 8 
> 20 yrs  1 4 1 4 2 8 
Total emergency management  4 4 3 12 7 28 
 Law enforcement < 5 yrs  0 0 0 0 0 0 
5-10 yrs  0 0 0 0 0 0 
10-15 yrs  1 4 0 0 1 4 
15 - 20 yrs  1 4 0 0 1 4 
> 20 yrs  11 44 5 20 16 64 
Total law enforcement  13 52 5 20 18 72 
Grand total (n = 25)  17 68 8 32 25 100 
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Jurisdictional Characteristics 
Survey questions 3 and 7 addressed jurisdictional experiences and the status of 
planning and policies of a respondent’s jurisdiction. The respondents were asked to 
describe historically what types of civil disturbances had occurred in their jurisdiction, if 
their jurisdiction had plans for a civil disturbance and if the those plans included or did 
not include, de-escalation techniques.  
Survey question number 3 examined five categories of jurisdictional experiences, 
no experience, permitted protests, unpermitted protests, spontaneous protests and full-
scale riots. The jurisdictional experience found that four (16%) had never experienced a 
civil disturbance and one (4%) had experience a full-scale riot for a total of 20% of the 
population. The remaining 80% of the population’s jurisdictions had experienced 
permitted, unpermitted and spontaneous protests of some kind. This experience level is 
constant with the response of survey question 8, regarding the type of response 
aggressive or passive, in which respondents, 68% of whom, would respond aggressively, 
while 32% would respond passively.   
Survey Question 7 asked respondents if their jurisdiction had plans or policies in 
place to respond to civil disturbances. Of the 25 respondents, 23 (92%) stated that their 
jurisdiction has plans for civil disturbances, 20 (80%) of which stated that de-escalation 
plans had been incorporated into those plans. It is also notable that four (16%) of the 
respondent’s jurisdictions had not experienced a civil disturbance and two (8%) had no 
plans or policies in place to respond to them.  
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Jurisdictional characteristics can contribute to the discussion of the type of 
response taken by a respondent, as much as their personal experiences. This may be due 
in part to a lack of different types of civil disturbances in those jurisdictions, which may 
be directly attributed to a lack of experience on the part of a respondent. 
Respondent Experience 
Respondents were surveyed about their personal experiences participating in, 
planning for and their decision-making rationale, for civil disturbances. The survey 
questions were designed to address research questions two and three, which asked if 
training, policies, biases or external stimuli, such as politics, economic or social 
conditions, contributed to or influenced decision-making factors, in the type of response 
action taken. Survey Questions 4, 5, and 6 were utilized to elicit the experience of the 
respondents.  
Survey Question 4 examined respondent personal experience in actual civil 
disturbances. Seven (28%) of the 25 respondents had no personal experience of actual 
participation in a civil disturbance of any kind. Fourteen (56%) of the respondents had 
participated in a permitted, unpermitted and spontaneous disturbance, and four in full-
scale riots.  
Survey Question 5 examined the planning experience of respondents in civil 
disturbances. As in the participation category, seven (28%) of respondent did have any 
experience, in this case, planning for a civil disturbance. Thirteen respondents had 
planning experience in a permitted, unpermitted and spontaneous disturbance, and five in 
full-scale riots for a combined experience total of 72%. 
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Survey Question 6 describes the factors which respondents who have been in the 
position of authority, utilized in their decision-making processes for civil disturbances. 
The decision factors that were considered by respondents included, no experience, 
training, policy, external influences and personal biases. In this question, nine 
respondents (36%) which is slightly higher than the previous two questions, had no 
decision-making experiences for civil disturbances. In the other two categories, Training 
and Policy, nine respondents (36%) based their decision-making on training and seven 
(28%) on policy, which combined, accounted for a total of sixty-four percent. There were 
no responses to categories examining external influences or biases for a zero percentage.  
In order examine whether respondent experiences would influence the type of 
response they would take as suggested in the research questions, a cross-tabulation 
analyzation of the three survey’s experience Survey Questions 4 (participation), 5 
(planning) and 6 decision-making, were conducted against Survey Question 8, (the type 
of response which a respondent would use to maintain or return a jurisdiction to 
normalcy), with the following results. 
Table 13 illustrates the results of the comparisons of the respondents’ 
participation experience and type of response they would utilize in responding to a civil 
disturbance. A total of 25 responses were received with 17 (68%) of respondents 
answering that they would respond to a civil disturbance in an aggressive manner, versus 
eight (32%) who opted for a passive response. For those who had never participated in a 
civil disturbance, three respondents opted for the aggressive response, while four would 
use a passive response. The remaining categories under the aggressive response, each 
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received either three or four responses, while the passive response categories were 
different. In the passive response category, spontaneous events and full-scale riots did not 
register any passive responses, but the permitted and un-permitted categories each 
received three and one responses respectively. 
Table 13. 
Respondent Participation Experience in Civil Disturbances and Response Type 
 
Table 14 illustrates the results of the comparisons of the respondents’ planning 
experience and type of response they would utilize in responding to a civil disturbance. 
As in the participation category, total of 25 responses were received with 17 (68%) of 
respondents answering that they would respond to a civil disturbance in an aggressive 
manner, versus eight (32%) who opted for a passive response. 
 
Table 14. 
 
Respondent Planning Experience in Civil Disturbances and Response Type 
Categories Aggressive % Passive % n % 
 No, I have never participated in the response to a civil disturbance  3 12 4 16 7 28 
Yes, permitted protests  3 12 3 12 6 24 
Yes, unpermitted protests  4 16 1 4 5 20 
Yes, spontaneous (e.g. response to a championship win by a sports  
        team) 
 
3 12 0 0 3 12 
Yes, full-scale riots  4 16 0 0 4 16 
Total (n = 25)  17 68 8 32 25 100 
Categories Aggressive % Passive % n % 
 No, I have never participated in the response to civil disturbance  4 16 3 12 7 28 
Yes, permitted protests  4 16 3 12 7 28 
Yes, unpermitted protests  4 16 1 4 5 20 
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Table 15 illustrates the results of the comparisons of the respondents’ planning 
experience and type of response they would utilize in responding to a civil disturbance. 
As in the participation category, total of 25 responses were received with 17 (68%) of 
respondents answering that they would respond to a civil disturbance in an aggressive 
manner, versus eight (32%) who opted for a passive response. 
Table 15. 
 
Respondent Decision-Making Rationale in Civil Disturbances and Response Type 
 
In Table 13, the type of response was broken down by discipline and experience, 
but the data in Table 16 will be examined for the type of response and the experience 
level of the respondents only. Respondents by a two to one margin, seventeen aggressive 
versus eight passives, believed that an aggressive response was the best way to maintain 
normalcy or return to normalcy during a civil disturbance. Respondents with more than 
20 years of experience, 12 (48%) in total, believed that an aggressive response was 
Yes, spontaneous (e.g. response to a championship win by a sports 
       team) 
 
1 4 0 0 1 4 
Yes, full-scale riots  4 16 1 4 5 20 
Total (n = 25)  17 68 8 32 25 100 
Categories Aggressive % Passive % n % 
 No, I have not been in the position of decision making during a civil 
       disturbance 
 
5 20 4 16 9 36 
Yes, my decisions were based on training  8 32 1 4 9 36 
Yes, my decisions were based on policy  4 16 3 12 7 28 
Yes, my decisions were based on external influences  0 0 0 0 0 0 
Yes, my decisions were based on personal biases  0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total (n = 25)  17 68 8 32 25 100 
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proper versus six (24%) who opted for a passive response. The remaining responses to 
the aggressive category were found in the <5 years, one (4%), two (8%) in 10 to 15 years 
and two (8%) in the 15 to 20 years of experience categories. The remaining passive 
responses were associated with respondents with five to ten years and fifteen to twenty 
years of experience categories.   
Table 16. 
 
Respondent Opinion for Response Type in Civil Disturbances 
 
As Table 17 shows, 14 (56%) respondents did not believe that considerations 
should be given to social, economic or political activity during times of civil disturbance, 
while 11 (44%) did believe in their inclusion. In trying to answer the question of whether 
experience was a factor for respondents, those with over 20 years of service, equally 
stated that they would and would not consider external influencers, with nine (36%) each. 
The remaining experience categories completed the survey results. 
  
Categories Aggressive % Passive % n % 
 < 5 yrs  1 4 0 0 1 4 
5 - 10 yrs  0 0 1 4 1 4 
10-15 yrs  2 8 0 4 2 8 
15 - 20 yrs  2 8 1  3 12 
> 20 yrs  12 48 6 24 18 72 
Total (n = 25)  17 68 8 32 25 100 
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Table 17. 
 
Respondent Opinion for Considerations Regarding Social and Economic 
Conditions or Political Activity 
 
As illustrated in Table 18, the opinions showed that 11 (44%) of respondents did 
not believe there was a need to update current tactics used in civil disturbances while 14 
(56%) did believe there was a need to update. Once again as observed in the previous 
question (Table 17) those with more than 20 years of experience accounted for a total of 
18 (72%) of the respondents, with 10 (40%) believing there was no need to change tactics 
and eight (32%) believed there was a need for change.   
Table 18. 
 
Respondent Opinion for Updating Response Tactics 
 
As illustrated in Table 19, 14 (56%) of respondents did believe that de-escalation 
techniques in civil disturbances would be effective, 8 (32%) believed there would be no 
Respondent experience No % Yes % n % 
 < 5 yrs  0 0 1 4 1  4 
5 - 10 yrs  1 4 0 0 1 4 
10-15 yrs  2 8 0 0 2 8 
15 - 20 yrs  2 8 1 4 3 12 
> 20 yrs  9 36 9 36 18 72 
Total (n = 25)  14 56 11 44 25 100 
Respondent experience No % Yes % n % 
 < 5 yrs  0 0 1 4 1 4 
5 - 10 yrs  0 0 1 4 1 4 
10-15 yrs  0 0 2 8 2 8 
15 - 20 yrs  1 4 2 8 3 12 
> 20 yrs  10 40 8 32 18 72 
Total (n = 25)  11 44 14 56 25 100 
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difference and three (12%) believed they would be ineffective. Once again as observed in 
the previous questions (Tables 16, 17 and 18) those with more than 20 years of 
experience accounted for most of the total responses with 18 (72%). 10 (40%) of the 
respondents believed de-escalation techniques would be effective, seven (28%) believed 
there would be no difference and three (12%) thought they would be ineffective. 
Table 19. 
 
Respondent Opinion on the Effectiveness of De-Escalation Techniques in Civil 
Disturbances 
 
 
Table 20 provides the results of the Survey question #12 and the respondent’s 
opinion, as to whether there is a need for the use of de-escalation techniques in civil 
disturbances. Overwhelmingly, 21 (84%) of respondents agreed that there was a need for 
de-escalation techniques in civil disturbances, while four (16%) did not. Of the 21 
respondents who believed that de-escalation techniques needed to be a part of the 
responses to civil disturbances, 16 had 20 or more years of experience, three had 15 – 20 
years, one had 5 -10 years and one had less than five years of experience. Of those 
respondents which did not believe there was need for de-escalation techniques in civil 
Respondent experience Effective % No difference % Ineffective % n % 
 < 5 yrs  1 4 0 0 0 0 1 4 
5 - 10 yrs  0 0 0 0 1 4 1 4 
10-15 yrs  0 0 1 4 1 4 2 8 
15 - 20 yrs  3 12 0 0 0 0 3 12 
> 20 yrs  10 40 7 28 1 4 18 72 
Total (n = 25)  14 56 8 32 3 12 25 100 
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disturbances had two respondents with 10 – 15 years of experience and two with more 
than twenty years. 
Table 20. 
 
Respondent Opinion on the Need for De-Escalation Techniques in Civil Disturbances 
 
Summary 
The objective of this study was to examine whether there was a need to include 
de-escalation techniques in the responses to civil disturbances. The survey was designed 
to elicit the opinions of respondents on the various aspects of response within a civil 
disturbance. Respondents were categorized by discipline, law enforcement and 
emergency management, and by the years of experience in those disciplines. The 
respondents were asked about the historical experiences of their jurisdictions, as well as 
their own experiences regarding participation, planning and decision-making with civil 
disturbances. Lastly, the respondents provided their opinions on the type of response they 
would use, the consideration of external influences, the need for new tactics, the 
effectiveness of de-escalation techniques and the need for de-escalation techniques in 
civil disturbances.   
Respondent experience No % Yes % n % 
 < 5 yrs  0 0 1 4 1 4 
5 - 10 yrs  0 0 1 4 1 4 
10-15 yrs  2 8 0 0 2 8 
15 - 20 yrs  0 0 3 12 3 12 
> 20 yrs  2 8 16 64 18 72 
Total (n = 25)  4 16 21 84 25 100 
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The central question in this study was to identify from the respondents whether 
there was a need for de-escalation techniques in civil disturbances. Overwhelmingly, 21 
(84%) of respondents agreed that there was a need for de-escalation techniques in civil 
disturbances, while at the same time, suggested that an aggressive response was their 
choice to either maintain or restoring order, by a two to one margin. These two results 
provided a sharp contrast in thinking with regards to response, because while the 
respondents believed that de-escalation techniques should be included in response plans, 
the aggressive posture was the preferred response option. Additionally, a solid majority 
of respondents believed the need for de-escalation techniques, 56% believed that they 
would be effective, while 44% either thought there would be no difference, or they would 
be ineffective.  
The opinions and experiences of respondents were a crucial part of this study to 
determine the need for changes in policies and responses to civil disturbances. The 
respondents that did reply to the survey were found to be very experienced in both law 
enforcement and emergency management disciplines. The results showed that 23 of the 
25 respondents (92%) had 10 or more years of experience. But, even with the many of 
years of experience possessed by the respondents in their respective disciplines, there was 
a lack of experience in the number of disturbance types they had been involved with. The 
results showed that the types of disturbances most experienced by the respondents 
involved either permitted, non-permitted or spontaneous incidents, noticeable lack of 
experience with full-scale riots from either discipline. 
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The jurisdictional aspect of each respondent also found that 80% had already 
established de-escalation techniques in their agencies response policies to civil 
disturbances. This aligns with the 84% who believed that there was a need for de-
escalation techniques in the responses to civil disturbances.  
Chapter 5 provides an interpretation of the findings, limitations of the study, 
recommendations for future research, and discusses the implications of these findings. 
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Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations 
Discussion 
For many decades, jurisdictions have used aggressive and violent means to 
respond to civil disturbances. Methods have included the use of armed military troops, 
police dogs, and riot forces to maintain control or regain normalcy. The purpose of this 
study was to evaluate the opinions and experiences of emergency managers and law 
enforcement officials, on how they would respond to civil disturbances and whether they 
believe there is a need to incorporate de-escalation techniques into response policies, as 
tactics, that could be used to reduce the destruction often associated with riots, as well as 
the violence between protestors and the police. 
The goal of this study was to extend the current literature on the subject as 
described in Chapter 2. Currently, the literature on de-escalation techniques is limited to 
the treatment of the mentally ill, the use of force by police, and verbal de-escalation 
measures, but I found nothing regarding the application of de-escalation measures to civil 
disturbances. It is in the realm of civil disturbances that this study will contribute to the 
subject matter. 
In this study, I incorporated three theoretical frameworks, working in conjunction 
with each other, to describe and interpret the various stages of a civil disturbance 
experienced by respondents and how their responses would apply to a disturbance. The 
chaos theory was the primary framework of the three used in this study because it 
governs response. The chaos theory suggests that as a society, in most cases, we live in a 
stable and normal environment and, on occasion, an event occurs that moves the 
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normalcy of society into chaos. It is the responsibility of emergency managers and law 
enforcement officials to take steps to either maintain normalcy or return from chaos to 
normalcy as quickly as possible. In doing so, the decisions being made by emergency 
managers and law enforcement officials may involve external influencers, biases, or a 
lack of experience. The second theoretical framework I used is the BDT, to understand 
the decision-making thought process of emergency managers and law enforcement 
officials in how they deal with those external influencers, biases or a lack of experience. 
The third framework being used is the strain theory, which help emergency managers and 
law enforcement officials to understand what may be causing the external influences that 
may affect the decisions being made by those emergency managers and law enforcement 
officials while trying to maintain normalcy or return society from chaos. The strain 
theory, developed by Merton (as cited in Marker, 2004), suggests that those participating 
in civil disturbances would normally be law abiding citizens if it weren’t for individual 
failures of societal goals such as education, political stature, and financial independence. 
The three frameworks complement each other in that the facets of the strain theory could 
explain the influences affecting the decision-making process in BDT, which could 
manifest itself as a decision during a civil disturbance in either a positive or negative 
way, causing an incident not to be returned to normalcy from a state of chaos or sending 
normalcy into chaos.  
Interpretation of Findings 
 I used the four research questions in this study to examine whether the lack of 
experience, training, policies, biases, or external stimuli (political, economic, or social 
72 
 
conditions), would influence the type of response taken in a civil disturbance. 
Additionally, through the research questions, I sought to determine if the previously 
mentioned influences would affect the decision to respond either aggressively or 
passively. Lastly, the respondents provided opinions as to whether de-escalation 
techniques would be effective either in a positive or negative manner. These factors 
ultimately contributed to the research in trying to determine whether there was a need for 
de-escalation techniques in civil disturbances.    
 As described in Chapter 2, there is little research on de-escalation techniques as 
they are applied to civil disturbances. Because the historical examples of response 
methods in civil disturbances have been more aggressive rather than passive, I designed 
the survey questions to elicit opinions from the respondents as to why this was occurring. 
The respondents were asked about their opinions and decision-making rationale through 
the survey questions to establish experience levels for themselves and their jurisdictions, 
the factors on which they based their decisions, and what types of responses they might 
make during a civil disturbance.  
 The survey questions targeted the previously mentioned issues to provide 
quantitative data that either does or does not support the research theories. The survey 
questions were organized into four parts: demographic information about the 
respondents, their experience and opinions and jurisdictional characteristics. The 
questions regarding the respondents’ opinions were based in the chaos theory and what 
kinds of responses would be used in civil disturbances. The questions in the survey 
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regarding participation, planning, and external influences contributing to decision-making 
in civil disturbances were aligned with the BDT and the strain theory.   
Summary 
 This study was designed to elicit the opinion of respondents about the need for de-
escalation techniques in civil disturbances. Because of the lack of literature in this area of 
de-escalation techniques and civil disturbances, the data could not be compared to 
previous findings. This study extends the limited research of whether de-escalation 
techniques are needed in the responses to civil disturbances. It is this lack of literature on 
this subject which allows this study to extend the knowledge of this subject. The subject 
of de-escalation techniques is a new concept for civil disturbances and the results of this 
research confirmed that. Currently, there is no research into the different aspects of 
experience, decision-making or jurisdictional preparedness with regards to civil 
disturbances and the need or not, for de-escalation techniques.  
 The study found that experience was a strong factor among respondents from law 
enforcement, but in comparison, the emergency management respondents were lacking in 
that same experience. All 18 law enforcement respondents had 10 years or more of 
experience, whereas only five emergency management respondents had that same amount 
of experience. This finding about experience level provides a historical context not only 
for their opinions based on training and experience, but one aspect of experience that was 
not surveyed was the point in the respondents’ career that the experience was garnered or 
how long it had been since they had the experience.  
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 This study also extends the knowledge base with regards to jurisdictional 
experiences and the status of de-escalation techniques in plans or policies within them. 
The data results showed that only one respondent’s jurisdiction had experienced a full-
scale riot, whereas all other experiences were limited to permitted or unpermitted protests 
or spontaneous events, like sports celebrations. The study results showed that a large 
percentage of respondents’ jurisdictions have plans for civil disturbances and did 
incorporate de-escalation techniques into those plans. 
 This study also extends knowledge of current policy makers in jurisdictions, on 
whether there is a need to consider external influencers, such as economic or social 
conditions. The inclusion of these considerations could affect how training is conducted, 
the updating of agency policies, and the decision-making aspects in response to civil 
disturbances. In the three categories surveyed, respondent participation in, planning for, 
and decision-making abilities for civil disturbances, all responded equally to what course 
of action each would take. The respondents in all three categories, by an 18 to 7 total, 
chose an aggressive response over a passive one. 
 The premise that a lack of experience versus actual experience in civil 
disturbances could influence the type of response action taken (aggressive versus 
passive), was supported by a 72 to 28% margin. As illustrated in Table 16, the results 
showed that experience was indeed a factor with respondents in determining the type of 
response that they would take. The category representing the most experienced 
respondents (> 20 years) showed that 12 of the 25 respondents would apply an aggressive 
style response to a civil disturbance. A further examination of all the respondents with 
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more than 10 years of experience showed that 16 of 17, would prefer an aggressive 
response.  
 Law enforcement and emergency managers must decide on a course of action in 
formulating response plans in times of civil disturbances. Morton and Fasolo (2009) in 
the BDT suggested that courses of action taken by people may be influenced by biases 
and other factors. BDT may be applied in a response scenario by escalating a scenario 
versus considering external influences such as social and economic conditions or political 
activity. The respondents did not believe that external influencers should be considered 
when deciding which type of response to a civil disturbance is conducted (e.g., aggressive 
or passive) by a 56 to 44% margin. 
 Historically, civil disturbances or riots have been responded to aggressively with 
the use of police dogs, armed federal troops, and police field forces. Respondents did 
believe that updating tactics used during civil disturbances should be implemented, by a 
56 to 44% margin. Fifty-six percent of respondents believed that de-escalation 
techniques, if incorporated into the response to a civil disturbance, would be effective, 
32% believed they would have no difference, and 12% believed de-escalation techniques 
would be ineffective. If the categories of no difference and ineffective were combined, 
they would have a total percentage of 44%, versus the 56% effective respondents. The 
categories of updating tactics and the effectiveness of de-escalation techniques (if the 
categories of no difference and ineffective were combined) were statistically equal, but 
contradictory. The contradiction comes from a perceived necessity to improve tactics but 
at the same time without trying, admitting that they would not be effective.  
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 When asked, if there was a need for de-escalation techniques to be incorporated 
into policies and response protocols, 84% of respondents answered in the affirmative 
with 16% negative. This question summarizes the entire survey with a resounding 
affirmation for the need to include de-escalation techniques into the response protocols 
and policies currently in place with regards to civil disturbances.   
 In conclusion, the results of this study have some contradictory instances between 
the need to include de-escalation techniques and the type of response favored by most 
respondents. The respondents while identifying a need for de-escalation, also 
overwhelmingly found that an aggressive response is best in response to civil 
disturbances. 
Limitations of the Study 
 In this study, limitations were observed, acknowledged and addressed. A 
limitation of quantitative studies by their nature require very large samples, in most cases 
in the thousands of respondents. Additionally, most organizations, jurisdictions and the 
public sector, do not have the resources or skills required to conduct a large-scale 
quantitative study. The positive aspects of quantitative studies include the ability to be 
administered and assessed quickly, as well as allow for comparisons between 
organizations and groups, in this case, emergency managers and law enforcement 
officials (Choy, 2014).  
An additional limitation of this study is the cross-sectional design which does not 
allow for researchers to randomly control their intrinsic and extrinsic variables or control 
the causation of independent variables (Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias, 2008). 
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Concerns regarding extrinsic variables should be minimal since this study used 
participants that currently work in the fields of emergency managers and law 
enforcement. Since the participants were selected from a specific geographic area, it is 
then assumed that the same disciplines could be identified and surveyed from a larger 
jurisdiction such as a state, multiple states or even nationally to replicate the survey on a 
larger scale. Intrinsic variable changes to survey would include factors such as the 
changing experiences of participants or changes in the population due to retirements, 
promotion or reassignment to other duties (Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias, 2008).    
A generic representative sample of the emergency managers and law enforcement 
positions was obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. The purpose of this data was 
to calculate a percentage of emergency managers and law enforcement chiefs in the 
United States and then compare that percentage against the study’s results. According to 
the Bureau of Labor Statistics (2017) there are 9,560 professionals classified as 
emergency management Directors, and Banks, Hendrix, Hickman, and Kyckelhahn 
(2016) estimate there are approximately 18,000 federal, state, county, and local law 
enforcement agencies. If the stipulation is made that each of these law enforcement 
agencies had a chief officer (Sheriff, Police Chief or Director), the number of the 
population would include the 9,560 emergency management directors, plus the 18,000 
Chief law enforcement officers, creating a control group totaling 27,560. When 
calculated for percentages, the combined Labor Department statistics, emergency 
management directors accounted for 35% of the population and law enforcement 
executive officers for 65%. In comparison, the results from the study showed a response 
78 
 
rate of 28% for emergency management respondents and 72% for law enforcement 
respondents. It is suggested that the differences between the emergency management 
study group and the statistical group is a -7 percent, while the law enforcement study 
group had a +7 percent over the statistical group.   
Recommendations 
 De-escalation techniques while a part of most jurisdictional policy, still need to be 
incorporated into the response tactics of jurisdictions, to help reduce confrontation 
between protestors and law enforcement. The study showed that by a 2:1 ratio, that the 
respondents believed that an aggressive posture during a response was the best way of 
quelling a civil disturbance, while a 5:1 ratio believed that there is a need for de-
escalation techniques. This shows a possible issue regarding how policies may not be 
keeping pace with societal norms and progress.  
Government entities of any size can utilize the results of this study to aid in 
determining if their agency is need of policy adoptions or revisions, regarding the need 
for the inclusion of de-escalation techniques. Agency decision-makers can adopt some or 
all the strategies provided in this study, by examining the potential risks brought on by 
civil disturbances and the effects on their jurisdictions, with the training of their 
personnel and incorporating de-escalation techniques into response protocols and policy. 
The results of this study showed that a majority of respondents, had many years of 
experience in their respective disciplines. While the study did gather basic data on 
personal and jurisdictional experiences, the research did not address the specifics of how 
that experience was gathered over individual careers. One very important aspect of 
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individual experience is training and while the research found that a large number of 
respondents were very experienced within their disciplines, it did not examine at what 
point in their careers that they received their training which could make it irrelevant, due 
to outdated response protocols. Determining the relevance of training is important to 
future research because it may have become outdated by advances in technology, legal 
precedence or changes in tactics by protestors. Based on these criterion, the training that a 
person may have received in the first one or two years of their careers may, twenty years 
later, no longer be viable options for a response to a civil disturbance. It is recommended 
that future research examine the levels or types of training taken by respondents, whether 
that training was standardized or ongoing over the course of a career.  
The results of the study showed an overwhelming consensus that there is a need 
for de-escalation techniques. A further recommendation is to include de-escalation 
techniques as a part of an agency’s policies. This would include a complete review by 
agencies of their emergency operations plans, specifically their annex regarding civil 
disturbances (if an agency has one), training, equipment and mutual aid agreements, all of 
which contribute to the way an agency responds to civil disturbances.    
Many law enforcement and emergency management agencies are now accredited 
by national and international bodies to provide standardization in areas such as 
organization, use of force and mutual aid. It is also recommended that accrediting 
organizations with oversight over law enforcement and emergency management 
disciplines, incorporate de-escalation techniques into their standards. It is also suggested 
that a national standard be developed with the help of these accreditation organizations at 
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a federal level to establish a consistency across both the law enforcement and emergency 
management disciplines for using de-escalation techniques in civil disturbances.   
My recommendations would be for agencies to review their policies and 
protocols, the way they train and the social, economic and political landscapes of their 
jurisdictions to see if there is a method to reduce confrontations and violence. While 
eliminating confrontation and violence may not be practical in every situation, the 
development of de-escalation techniques may prove to be beneficial in some instances.   
Implications 
The benefit of this research will provide a social impact by policy changes which 
could create a positive impact in lessening the severity and scope of an incident. As 
discussed previously, historical response tactics have included armed federal troops, 
dogs, water cannons and currently, “militarized field forces” from law enforcement. The 
data from this study showed that 56% of respondents believed there was a need to update 
response tactics. A change in response tactics could lead to a reduction in confrontations 
between law enforcement and protestors and ultimately a reduction of violence and 
destruction. Several factors that could prove beneficial and impactful towards achieving 
social change need to include changes in tactics, training and standardization.  
The changes in tactics could include new technologies which may allow for the 
use of less personnel in responding to a civil disturbance. According to Simonson and 
Staw (1992) the mere appearance of a deployment of a “field force” unit, could be 
interpreted as an “escalation” factor by protestors. New technologies may be useful in 
81 
 
accomplishing the desired result of force multiplication without deploying the actual 
resources as previously used. 
 Training could prove to be one of the most important factors considered in the 
response to civil disturbances. The standardization of training would be most beneficial 
as impact on social change. When there is no standardization in training, responses can 
vary as much as an incident. Standardized training allows for emergency managers to 
establish policy and protocols based on the training being conducted at a current moment 
and time. As changes occur, the standard is changed and then taught to personnel to 
maintain a level of proficiency. Standardization also allows for the seamless integration 
of agencies during mutual aid incidents because all personnel have been trained to the 
same standard.  
 The results of this study have determined that there is a need for the inclusion of 
de-escalation techniques and they would effective in civil disturbances. While 
respondents believe that an aggressive response is the preferred method to restoring or 
maintaining order, they also believe that there is a need for a change in tactics. 
Jurisdictions need to address their policies and protocols to determine how they can 
include de-escalation techniques, to try and deter confrontations and violence, which may 
occur unnecessarily and could have been easily avoided by changes in the way responses 
are made in civil disturbances.  
82 
 
References 
Baltimore City Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge #3. (2015). Baltimore City Fraternal 
Order of Police, Lodge #3, After Action Review: A review of the management of 
the 2015 Baltimore riots. 
Banks, D., Hendrix, J., Hickman, M., & Kyckelhahn, T. (2016). National Sources of Law 
Enforcement Employment Data (NCJ 249681). Washington, DC: Government 
Printing Office. 
Brown Jr., L. T. (2017). Different lyrics, same song: Watts, Ferguson, and the stagnating 
effect of the politics of law and order. Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law 
Review, 52(2), 305-356. Retrieved from: http://harvardcrcl.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/07/Brown.pdf 
Bureau of Labor Statistics. (2017). Occupational Employment and Wages, May 2017. 
https://www.bls.gov/ooh/management /emergency-management-directors.htm 
Choy, L. T. (2014). The strengths and weaknesses of research methodology: Comparison 
and complimentary between qualitative and quantitative approaches. IOSR 
Journal of Humanities and Social Science, 19(4), 99-104. doi:10.9790/0837-
194399104 
Corwin, M. (1993, April 13). L.A. Copying Miami's Failures at Rebuilding after Riots. 
The Tech. Retrieved from http://tech.mit.edu/V113/N20/riots.20w.html 
Costello, A. (2015). Removing the concept of impossibility from public administration: 
The case made by Kevin Morrell and Graeme Currie. Public Administration 
Review, 75(2), 277-278. doi:10.1111/puar.12328. 
83 
 
Creswell, J. W. (2013). Research design: Qualitative, quantitative, and mixed methods 
approaches. Thousand Oaks, California: Sage publications. 
Curseu, P. L., Schruijer, S. G., & Fodor, O. C. (2016). Decision rules, escalation of 
commitment and sensitivity to framing in group decision-making: An 
experimental investigation. Management Decision, 54(7), 1649-1668. 
Dalton, R., Van Sickle, A., & Weldon, S. (2010). The individual-institutional nexus of 
protest behaviour. British Journal of Political Science, 40(1), 51-73. 
doi:10.1017/S000712340999038X 
Dantzker, M., & Hunter, R. (2006). Research methods for criminology and criminal 
justice: A primer. Burlington, Massachusetts: Jones & Bartlett Learning. 
DiPasqualea, D. & Glaeser, E., (1998). The Los Angeles riot and the economics of urban 
unrest. Journal of Urban Economics, 43(1), 52-78.  
https://doi.org/10.1006/juec.1996.2035 
De-escalation. (n.d.). In Merriam-Webster’s online dictionary. Retrieved from 
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/deescalation 
Einhorn, H. J., & Hogarth, R. M. (1981). Behavioral decision theory: Processes of 
judgement and choice. Annual Review of Psychology, 32(1), 53-88. doi: 
10.2307/2490959 
Farazmand, A. (2003). Chaos and transformation theories: A theoretical analysis with 
implications for organization theory and public management. Public Organization 
Review, 3(4), 339-372. https://doi.org/10.1023/B:PORJ.0000 
Forsyth, Donelson R. (1980a). A taxonomy of ethical ideologies. Journal of Personality 
84 
 
and Social Psychology, 39(1), 175-184. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.39.1.175 
Forsyth, D. R. (1980b). Ethics Position Questionnaire [Database record]. Retrieved from 
sycTESTS. doi:10.1037/t45699-000 
Frankfort-Nachmias, C., & Nachmias, D. (2008). Research methods in the social sciences 
(7th ed.). New York, New York: Worth. 
Glidewell, J. C., & Hargrove, E. C. (1990). Impossible jobs in public management.  
Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas. 
Hahn, H. (1970). Civic responses to riots: A reappraisal of Kerner Commission data. The 
Public Opinion Quarterly, 34(1), 101-107. https://www.jstor.org/stable/2747887 
Institute for Intergovernmental Research. (2015). After-Action Assessment of the Police 
Response to the August 2014 Demonstrations in Ferguson, Missouri. COPS 
Office Critical Response Initiative. Retrieved from https://ric-zai-
inc.com/Publications/cops-p317-pub.pdf 
International Association of Chiefs of Police. (2017). National Consensus Policy and 
Discussion Paper on Use of Force. Retrieved from http://www.theiacp.org 
/Portals/0/documents/pdfs/National_Consensus_Policy_On_Use_Of_Force.pdf. 
Katz, M.B. (2008) Why don’t American cities burn very often? Journal of Urban 
History, 34(2), 185-208.  https://doi.org/10.1177/0096144207308682 
Kerner Commission. (1968). Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil 
Disorders. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office. Retrieved from: 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/8073NCJRS.pdf 
Kesic, D., Thomas, S., & Ogloff, J. (2013). Use of nonfatal force on and by persons with 
85 
 
apparent mental disorder in encounters with police. Criminal justice and 
behavior, 40(3), 321-337. https://doi.org/10.1177/0093854812474425 
Kiel, L. D., & Elliott, E. W. (1996). Chaos theory in the social sciences: Foundations 
and applications. Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Press.  
Krishnamurthy, V. (2015). Edward Norton Lorenz; Discoverer of chaos. Resonance, 
20(3), 191. doi:10.1007/s12045-015-0169-4 
Lorenz, E. N. (1963). Deterministic nonperiodic flow. Journal of the Atmospheric 
Sciences, 20(2), 130-141.  
doi:10.1175/1520-0469(1963)020<0130:DNF>2.0.CO;2 
Marker, S. L. (2004). The ritual of riots: Discovering a process model US riots (Doctoral 
dissertation, University of Colorado). Retrieved from 
http://libraries.colorado.edu/record=b3781053~S3 
Maurantonio, N. (2014). Remembering Rodney King: Myth, racial reconciliation, and 
civil rights history. Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly, 91(4), 740-
755. https://doi.org/10.1177/1077699014550094 
Maxwell, J. A. (2012). Qualitative research design: An interactive approach (Vol. 41). 
Thousand Oaks, California: Sage publications. 
McHugh, K. (2015, April 27). Baltimore Mayor: City ‘Gave Space’ to Rioters ‘Who 
Wished to Destroy’. Breitbart. Retrieved from: http://www.breitbart.com/big-
government/2015/04/27/baltimore-mayor-city-gave-space-to-rioters-who-wished-
to-destroy/ 
Merton, R. K. (1938). Social structure and anomie. American Sociological Review, 3(5), 
86 
 
672-682. doi:10.2307/2084686 
Merton, R. K. (1967). Social Theory and Social Structure. New York, New York: Free 
Press, 1967. 
Miller, A. H. (2001). The Los Angeles riots: A study in crisis paralysis. Journal of 
Contingencies and Crisis Management, 9(4), 189-199. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-5973.00169 
Mills, A. J., Durepos, G. & Wiebe, E. (Eds.). (2010). Encyclopedia of case study 
research: L-Z; index.Vol.1. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications Ltd doi: 
10.4135/9781412957397 
Mills, S. B., & Ivacko, T. M. (2016). Local leaders say police-community relations are 
good throughout Michigan, but those in large cities are concerned about potential 
unrest over police use-of-force. Michigan Public Policy Survey. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2737454 
Mohl, R. (1990). On the Edge: Blacks and Hispanics in Metropolitan Miami since 1959. 
The Florida Historical Quarterly, 69(1), 37-56. Retrieved from 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/30148998 
Morrell, G., Scott, S., McNeish, D., & Webster, S. (2011). The August riots in England: 
Understanding the involvement of young people. National Survey Research 
Centre. Retrieved from http://www.natcen.ac.uk/medi a/27459/the-august-riots-
in-england.pdf 
Morrell, K., & Currie, G. (2015). Impossible jobs or impossible tasks? Client volatility 
and frontline policing practice in urban riots. Public Administration 
87 
 
Review, 75(2), 264-275. https://doi.org/10.1111/puar.12311 
Morton, A., & Fasolo, B. (2009). Behavioural decision theory for multi-criteria decision 
analysis: A guided tour. The Journal of the Operational Research Society, 60(2), 
268-275. https://doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.jors.2602550 
Murphy, P. (1996). Chaos theory as a model for managing issues and crises. Public 
relations review, 22(2), 95-113. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0363-8111(96)90001-6  
Myers, D. J. (2000). The diffusion of collective violence: Infectiousness, susceptibility, 
and mass media networks. American Journal of Sociology, 106(1), 173-208. 
https://doi.org/10.1086/303110 
Myers-Montgomery, J. (2016). Militarized police and unpermitted protest implementing 
policy that civilizes the police. Cultural Studies? Critical Methodologies, 16(3), 
278-286. https://doi.org/10.1177/1532708616634774 
Naegler, L. (2014). The Ritual of Insurrection and the ‘Thrill-Seeking Youth’. An Instant 
Ethnography of Inner-City Riots in Germany. In Riot, unrest and protest on the 
global stage (pp. 151-168). Palgrave Macmillan, London. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-137-30553-4_9 
Newburn, T. (2016). Reflections on why riots don’t happen. Theoretical Criminology, 
20(2), 125-144. https://doi.org/10.1177/1362480615598829 
Olzak, S., & Shanahan, S. (1996). Deprivation and race riots: An extension of 
Spilerman's analysis. Social Forces, 74(3), 931-961. 
https://doi.org/10.1093/sf/74.3.931 
Piven, F. F., & Cloward, R. (2011). The Weight of the Poor: A Strategy to End Poverty 
88 
 
(reprinted with a new introduction by Frances Fox Piven) New Introduction. New 
Political Science, 33(3), 271-284. https://doi.org/10.1080/07393148.2011.591906 
Price, O., Baker, J., Bee, P., & Lovell, K. (2015). Learning and performance outcomes of 
mental health staff training in de-escalation techniques for the management of 
violence and aggression. The British Journal of Psychiatry, 206(6), 447-455.  
https://doi.org/10.1192/bjp.bp.114.144576 
Pritchard, D., & Pakes, F. (Eds.). (2016). Riot, unrest and protest on the global stage. 
New York, New York; St. Martin’s Press. doi:10.1007/978-1-137-30553-4 
Scacco, A. (2010). Who riots? Explaining individual participation in ethnic violence. 
New York, New York: Columbia University. 
Simonson, I., & Staw, B. M. (1992). Deescalation strategies: A comparison of techniques 
for reducing commitment to losing courses of action. Journal of Applied 
Psychology, 77(4), 419-426. 
http://dx.doi.org.ezp.waldenulibrary.org/10.1037/0021-9010.77.4.419 
Simpkin, S., & Sapsed, E. (2012). I predict a riot–quantifying the characteristics of areas 
that led to rioting in England in August 2011. Safer Communities, 11(2), 78-89. 
 https://doi.org/10.1108/17578041211215302 
Spilerman, S. (1970). The causes of racial disturbances: A comparison of alternative 
explanations. American Sociological Review, 35(4), 627-649. 
doi:10.2307/2093941 
Staron, M., & Meding, W. (2009, November). Ensuring reliability of information 
provided by measurement systems. In International Workshop on Software 
89 
 
Measurement, (pp. 1-16). Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. 
 https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-05415-0_1 
Steidl, C. (2013). Remembering May 4, 1970 Integrating the Commemorative Field at 
Kent State. American sociological review, 78(5), 749-772. 
  https://doi.org/10.1177/0003122413500273 
United States Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division. (2015). Investigation of the 
Ferguson Police Department. US Department of Justice. Washington, DC: 
Government Printing Office. Retrieved from: 
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-
releases/attachments/2015/03/04/ferguson_police_department_report.pdf 
Wainwright, J., & Ortiz, R. (2006). The Battles in Miami: The Fall of the FTAA/ALCA 
and the Promise of Transnational Movements. Environment and Planning D: 
Society and Space, 24(3), 349–366. https://doi.org/10.1068/d3604 
White, K. S. (2013). Uncovering Crowd Behavioral Variables to Understand Crowd 
Violence (Doctoral dissertation, Walden University). Retrieved from 
https://search.proquest.com/openview/aae16d9b5cafce0bf60e3607b518994f/1?pq
-origsite=gscholar&cbl=18750&diss=y 
Yazici, A., & Yazici, S. (2010). A study of the reliability and validity of ethics position 
questionnaire. Journal of Turkish Educational Sciences, 8(4), 1014-1017. 
Retrieved from 
https://ezp.waldenulibrary.org/login?url=https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?
direct=true&db=eue&AN=59663318&site=eds-live&scope=site 
90 
 
Appendix A: Ethics Position Questionnaire EPQ 
Instructions. You will find a series of general statements listed below. Each represents a 
commonly held opinion and there are no right or wrong answers. You will probably 
disagree with some items and agree with others. We are interested in the extent to which 
you agree or disagree with such matters of opinion. Please read each statement carefully. 
Then indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree by placing in front of the 
statement the number corresponding to your feelings, where: 
 
1 = Completely disagree  4 = Slightly disagree   1 = Moderately agree 
2 = Largely disagree  5 = Neither agree nor disagree 8 = Largely agree 
3 = Moderately disagree 6 - Slightly agree   9 = Completely agree 
 
1. A person should make certain that their actions never intentionally harm another even 
to a small degree. 
2. Risks to another should never be tolerated, irrespective of how small the risks might 
be. 
3. The existence of potential harm to others is always wrong, irrespective of the benefits 
to be gained. 
4. One should never psychologically or physically harm another person. 
5. One should not perform an action which might in any way threaten the dignity and 
welfare of another individual. 
6. If an action could harm an innocent other, then it should not be done. 
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7. Deciding whether or not to perform an act by balancing the positive consequences of 
the act against the negative consequences of the act is immoral. 
8. The dignity and welfare of people should be the most important concern in any 
society. 
9. It is never necessary to sacrifice the welfare of others. 
10. Moral actions are those which closely match ideals of the most "perfect" action. 
11. There are no ethical principles that are so important that they should be a part of any 
code of ethics. 
12. What is ethical varies from one situation and society to another. 
13. Moral standards should be seen as being individualistic; what one person considers to 
be moral may be judged to be immoral by another person. 
14. Different types of moralities cannot be compared as to "rightness." 
15. Questions of what is ethical for everyone can never be resolved since what is moral or 
immoral is up to the individual. 
16. Moral standards are simply personal rules which indicate how a person should behave 
and are not to be applied in making judgments of others. 
17. Ethical considerations in interpersonal relations are so complex that individuals 
should be allowed to formulate their own individual codes. 
18. Rigidly codifying an ethical position that prevents certain types of actions could stand 
in the way of better human relations and adjustment. 
19. No rule concerning lying can be formulated; whether a lie is permissible or not 
permissible totally depends upon the situation. 
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20. Whether a lie is judged to be moral or immoral depends upon the circumstances 
surrounding the action. 
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Appendix B: Survey Questions 
1. Which discipline do you most closely align your duties? 
a. Emergency Management  
b. Law Enforcement 
2. What is your experience (in years) in this position? 
a. Less than 5 Years  
b. 5 - 10 Years 
c. 10 - 15 Years  
d. 15 - 20 Years 
e. More than 20 years 
3. Has your jurisdiction experienced a civil disturbance? 
a. No, my jurisdiction has not experienced a civil disturbance. 
b. Yes, Permitted protests 
c. Yes, Unpermitted protests  
d. Yes, Spontaneous (e.g. response to a championship win by a sports team) 
e. Yes, Full-scale riots 
4. Have you ever participated in the response to a civil disturbance? 
a. No, I have never participated in the response to a civil disturbance  
b. Yes, Permitted protests 
c. Yes, Unpermitted protests  
d. Yes, Spontaneous (e.g. response to a championship win by a sports team) 
e. Yes, Full-scale riots 
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5. Have you ever planned for a response to a civil disturbance? 
a. No, I have not planned a response to a civil disturbance.  
b. Yes, Permitted protests  
c. Yes, Unpermitted protests 
d. Yes, Spontaneous (e.g. response to a championship win by a sports team) 
e. Yes, Full-scale riots 
6. Have you ever been in the position of decision making during a civil disturbance? 
a. No, I have not been in the position of decision making during a civil 
disturbance.  
b. Yes, my decisions were based on Training. 
c. Yes, my decisions were based on Policy. 
d. Yes, my decisions were based on External Influences. 
e. Yes, my decisions were based on Personal Biases. 
7. Does your agency have a plan or policies in place to address civil disturbances? 
a. No, my agency does not have a plan or policies in place to address civil 
disturbances. 
b. Yes, my agency does have a plan or policies in place to address civil 
disturbances but has not incorporated de-escalation techniques. 
c. Yes, my agency does have a plan or policies in place to address civil 
disturbances and has incorporated de-escalation techniques. 
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8. The Chaos Theory as it applies to emergency management, implies that an 
emergency manager should try to maintain normalcy or return to normalcy from 
chaos as quickly as possible, in order to reduce or avoid violence and destruction.  
In your opinion, which would you consider the proper type of response to a civil 
disturbance in either maintaining or returning to normalcy? 
a. Aggressive 
b. Passive 
9. In your opinion, do you think that considerations regarding social and economic 
conditions or political activity, should be given to a situation when deciding 
which type of a response to a civil disturbance is conducted, e.g. aggressive or 
passive? 
a. Yes 
b.  No  
10. In your opinion, do the current tactics used in the response to civil disturbances 
need updating? 
a. Yes 
b. No 
11. In your opinion, how effective do you think de-escalation techniques would be if 
they were made a part of response protocols, to reduce or prevent violence during 
a civil disturbance? 
a. Effective 
b. No Difference 
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c. Ineffective 
12. In your opinion, is there a need for the use of de-escalation techniques in civil 
disturbances? 
a. Yes  
b. No 
